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THE TAIL STILL WAGS THE DOG:
THE PERVASIVE AND INAPPROPRIATE INFLUENCE
BY THE PSYCHIATRIC PROFESSION ON
THE CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCESS
WILLIAM M. BROOKS*

ABSTRACT
The imposition of substantive and procedural protections in the civil
commitment process thirty years ago created the expectation that courts
would scrutinize commitment decisions by psychiatrists more closely and
serve as a check on psychiatric decision-making. This has not happened.
Today, psychiatrists continue to play an overly influential role in the
civil commitment process. Psychiatrists make initial commitment decisions
that often lack accuracy because they rely on clinical judgment only.
Furthermore, many psychiatrists do not want legal standards interfering
with treatment decisions, and the nebulous nature of the concept of dangerousness enables doctors to make pretextual assessments of danger. At civil
commitment hearings, lawyers for patients often fail to vigorously represent
their clients. Judges continue to defer, almost blindly, to expert testimony.
The result, no doubt, has been the confinement of nondangerous mentally ill
individuals.
Numerous steps can be taken to help lessen the inappropriate influence
of psychiatrists. First, psychiatrists can engage in structured risk assessment evaluations. Next, courts can, as a matter of right, provide expert
assistance to patients in a way that will not significantly delay civil commitment proceedings. Furthermore, courts should prohibit expert opinion
testimony on dangerousness based on clinical judgment alone. Finally,
patients’ lawyers can systematically appeal civil commitment decisions to
facilitate the development of a body of law that can serve to clarify what
mental states and conduct constitute a sufficient level of dangerousness as
to warrant involuntary hospitalization.
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INTRODUCTION

In the United States, psychiatric hospitals involuntarily confine more
than one million individuals per year,1 a process the Supreme Court has
characterized as “a massive curtailment of liberty[.]”2 Until the late 1960s
and early 1970s, hospitals committed individuals on the basis that such
people required care and treatment.3 Indeed, prior to 1972, courts paid little
attention to the standards and procedures governing civil commitment.4
The civil commitment process was characterized by cursory psychiatric
evaluations that resulted in commitment of most individuals against whom
proceedings were commenced; individuals were powerless and the commitment process forced them into psychiatric hospitals, often for indeterminate
periods.5
However, in 1972, a three-judge court, in Lessard v. Schmidt,6 invaliddated Wisconsin’s civil commitment laws on both substantive and proce7
dural grounds. The court found the state’s commitment standards violated
substantive due process because the standards authorized the confinement
of nondangerous individuals.8 Because civil commitment deprived an
individual of liberty, the state could justify its means only by invoking a
9
compelling government interest. Only the interest in protecting against
harm to oneself or others justified depriving someone of liberty through the

*Professor of Law and Director of the Civil Rights Litigation Law Clinic, Touro College,
Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, Central Islip, New York. The author would like to thank Rodger
Citron for his helpful comments on the article. The author would also like to thank Laurel Spahn,
Tony Rothert, and Susan Stefan for gathering or facilitating the gathering of data about the civil
commitment process in areas outside of New York.
1. John K. Cornwell, Understanding the Role of the Police and Parens Patriae Powers in
Involuntary Civil Commitment Before and After Hendricks, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 377,
378 n.6 (1998).
2. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980) (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509
(1972)).
3. Bruce Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing, 10 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 37, 39 (1999).
4. In 1972, the Supreme Court noted the absence of litigation challenging the states’ authority to confine mentally ill individuals. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 n.22 (1972).
5. Virginia A. Hiday, Reformed Commitment Procedures: An Empirical Study in the
Courtroom, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 651, 651 (1977).
6. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Schmidt v.
Lessard, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated and enforced sub nom. Lessard v. Schmidt, 379 F. Supp.
1376 (D. Wis. 1974), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Schmidt v. Lessard, 421 U.S. 957
(1975), reinstated sub nom. Lessard v. Schmidt, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
7. Id. at 1090-1103.
8. Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1093.
9. Id. at 1084.
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state’s civil commitment process.10 Three years later, the Supreme Court
reached a similar conclusion in the context of a damages action filed by an
individual confined many years at a state psychiatric hospital in Florida.
The court held, in O’Connor v. Donaldson,11 the state could not confine a
nondangerous individual who was capable of living safely outside an institutional setting with the help of family or friends.12
Following the decisions in Lessard and O’Connor, numerous lower
courts examined the constitutionality of civil commitment laws that
authorized the confinement of nondangerous individuals. These statutes
authorized confinement of individuals deemed to be in need of care and
treatment regardless of whether the patient was dangerous.13 This type of
commitment standard places great discretion in the hands of physicians:
whether a person requires care and treatment for mental illness requires a
clinician to simply exercise clinical judgment as a way to determine
whether a patient satisfies the legal criteria for civil commitment.
The courts that examined the constitutionality of the states’ commitment standards unanimously held states could not confine involuntarily
nondangerous mentally ill individuals.14 A state’s interest in providing the
care and treatment deemed necessary simply could not justify the significant deprivation of liberty that civil commitment entailed.15 As a result,
physicians could not confine mentally ill individuals unless the patients
posed a danger to themselves or others.16 In theory, the imposition of a
dangerousness requirement in lieu of a care and treatment standard limited
the amount of clinical discretion psychiatrists exercised because it provided
more objective criteria to govern civil commitment.17 Moreover, the
imposition of procedural protections—designed to provide a meaningful
10. Id. at 1084-86.
11. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
12. O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575.
13. See, e.g., Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 965-66 (2d Cir. 1983); Lessard, 349
F. Supp. at 1093.
14. See Project Release, 722 F.2d at 973; Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173, 178 (9th Cir. 1980);
Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. Court for Salt Lake Cnty., 469 F. Supp. 424, 432 (D. Utah 1979);
Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 449-51 (D. Iowa 1976); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp.
509, 514-15 (D. Neb. 1975); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 389-92 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Bell v.
Wayne Cnty. Gen. Hosp. at Eloise, 384 F. Supp. 1085, 1095-98 (E.D. Mich. 1974); State ex rel.
Hawks v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109, 123 (W. Va. 1974).
15. See, e.g., Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1093; State ex rel. Hawks, 202 S.E.2d at 123; In re
Harry M., 468 N.Y.S.2d 359, 364 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
16. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
17. See R. Michael Bagby, The Effects of Legislative Reform on Admission Rates to
Psychiatric Units of General Hospitals, 10 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 383, 384 (1987) (discussing
how dangerousness criterion is allegedly more objective and capable of being addressed in a
sounder evidentiary manner than care and treatment statutes that were couched in medical
language).
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opportunity to challenge one’s hospitalization—further theoretically
curtailed the ability of psychiatrists to effectuate involuntary hospitalization
of those individuals deemed to be in need of inpatient care because courts
become the decision-makers as to whether patients have satisfied the civil
commitment criteria.18
The imposition of substantive and procedural protections on the civil
commitment process theoretically made the civil commitment process more
legalistic than medical in nature. However, approximately thirty years after
the imposition of legal protections designed to provide objective legal
criteria to govern the deprivation of liberty resulting from involuntary
hospitalization, psychiatrists still exercise not only an inordinate amount of
influence on the civil commitment process, but an inappropriately inordinate amount of influence on the process. Indeed, the narrowing of commitment statutes failed to result in a decrease in the instances of commitment,
which suggests tighter standards and procedures have not been applied in
practice.19
The pervasive influence of psychiatrists first begins at the initial
admission stage. Most states authorize involuntary confinement of allegedly mentally ill individuals upon the certification of physicians that a civil
committee poses a danger to the committee’s self or others.20 Once hospitalized, when civil committees challenge their confinement in court,
psychiatrists testifying on behalf of the confining hospitals render opinions
about an individual’s mental illness and dangerousness. However, civil
committees often do not have the opportunity to offer their own expert.21
As a result, patients are significantly disadvantaged because judges will
invariably defer to expert testimony when deciding whether to authorize the
confinement of the civil committee.22 The upshot is psychiatric hospitals

18. The Supreme Court has held due process required the use of a clear and convincing
evidentiary standard at commitment hearings. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 (1979).
Lower courts have held that due process requires the provision of such procedural protections as
the right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and notice of
rights. See, e.g., Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968) (right to counsel);
Stamus, 414 F. Supp. at 447-48 (right to counsel); Doremus, 407 F. Supp. at 515-16 (right to
counsel, to notice of hearing, and to confront and cross-examine witnesses); Lynch, 386 F. Supp.
at 388-89 (right to counsel, to notice of hearing, and to confront and cross-examine witnesses);
Lessard, 349 F. Supp. at 1092, 1097 (right to counsel and notice of hearing).
19. GARY B. MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS § 10.05, at
348 (3d ed. 2007).
20. Bagby, supra note 17, at 383 (noting forty-eight states had adopted dangerousness
criterion by 1980); SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 10105 (3d ed. 1985) (detailing the authorization of involuntary hospitalization by medical certifycations in the majority of states).
21. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 138-41 and accompanying text.
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retain control over the confinement of those individuals deemed to require
inpatient confinement.23
Many reasons exist to question the influence psychiatrists exercise over
the commitment process. First, psychiatrists possess a well-recognized bias
toward treatment.24 Second, evidence indicates that while psychiatrists are
not as inept at evaluating an individual’s dangerousness as originally
thought, psychiatrists are not particularly good at assessing risk either.25 As
a result of these considerations, it may well be that only the threat of civil
liability serves as a check upon psychiatrists’ desire to provide treatment
that is deemed clinically appropriate by certifying a patient as dangerous.26
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, few legal concepts are more ambiguous than the concept of danger. The concept of dangerousness has engendered its share of confusion among courts, legislatures, and scholars. This
confusion has no doubt resulted in part from the failure of the courts that
originally required a finding of dangerousness to define what they meant by
“dangerousness.”27
Moreover, it remains unclear whether dangerousness is a concept that
focuses only on the likelihood of causing physical harm to oneself and
others, or also includes harm to property. Does it include the likelihood of
committing emotional harm to others or financial ruin to oneself that results
from a spending spree in a manic state? While the commission of harm
need not be a certainty, must the likelihood of potential harm reach a certain
probability level before commitment can be authorized? Must a court or
psychiatrist take into account the imminence of potential harm? What
about the magnitude of potential harm? The longer these questions remain
23. See, e.g., infra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 58-65, 310-11 and accompanying text.
26. However, because of the difficulty in prevailing in a damages action against a physician,
even the threat of a damages action may very well prove more illusory than real. A civil rights
plaintiff faces a number of hurdles to overcome in order to prevail in an action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. If the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought release in state court, collateral estoppel will
bar an attempt to litigate the legality of the confinement. See, e.g., Kulak v. City of New York, 88
F.3d 63, 71-73 (2d Cir. 1996). Furthermore, immunity attaches to physicians’ actions if any
objectively reasonable basis existed for physicians to conclude patients posed a danger to themselves or others. See, e.g., Glass v. Mayas, 984 F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1993). Courts have shown a
willingness to equate the symptoms of mental illness with evidence of dangerousness without any
direct evidence tying the symptomatology with an increased risk of harm. See, e.g., Mawhirt v.
Ahmed, 86 F. Supp. 2d 81, 89-90 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (equating dangerousness with paranoid and
delusional behavior without any testimony connecting the symptoms with an enhanced risk of
harm); Katzman v. Khan, 67 F. Supp. 2d 103, 110 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (determining it was
objectively reasonable to find a plaintiff dangerous as he was delusional and behaving bizarrely).
27. See, e.g., Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 973 (2d Cir. 1983); Stamus v.
Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 450-51 (D. Iowa 1976); Bell v. Wayne Cnty. Gen. Hosp. at Eloise,
384 F. Supp. 1085, 1095-98 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1087, 1093
(E.D. Wis. 1972).
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unanswered, the greater the power for psychiatrists to confine individuals
and to seek influence over judicial assessments of danger.28
A significant difference exists between understanding what a dangerousness evaluation actually entails and properly applying the legal and
clinical criteria an assessment of danger encompasses. Most state statutes
and court decisions simply have not incorporated all of the components of a
dangerousness determination: probability, imminence, and magnitude of
harm to person.29 The absence of these clarifying concepts, which would
limit the discretion of the civil commitment evaluators, provides an opportunity for psychiatrists to label individuals as dangerous when the doctors
wish to confine people deemed to be in need of treatment. Significantly,
when psychiatrists learn the legal system imposes few constraints on their
clinical decision-making, they tend to disregard the law and permit their
clinical judgment to dictate how they will act.30
This article will first explain what it means to be dangerous: posing a
sufficiently high probability of causing harm as to warrant clinical intervention in the form of involuntary hospitalization. It will then detail that, to
the extent the ability of psychiatrists to make assessments in the civil
commitment context is known, the ability is not very good. Numerous
reasons exist to explain why psychiatrists lack the ability to accurately
assess risk. First, they generally rely excessively on clinical judgment
alone, which results in a failure to apply criteria that have been empirically
linked to an increased risk of harm-causing behavior. Non-clinical factors
also adversely impact the clinical assessment process. These factors
include a bias toward treatment and a fear of liability or other adverse
consequences if a doctor wrongfully assesses a person as nondangerous.
Next, this article will describe not only do psychiatrists lack an ability
to accurately assess danger, but many assessments of risk are pretextual in
nature. Doctors want to treat people deemed to require care and treatment,
and if they must certify a patient as dangerous in order to facilitate
treatment, doctors will do so. The article will then focus on the ability of
civil commitment hearings to remedy errors at the certification stage of the
commitment process. Judges routinely defer to psychiatric assessments of
danger, and lawyers that represent patients all too often fail to engage in the
28. See infra notes 183-214 and accompanying text.
29. See People v. Stevens, 761 P.2d 768, 772-73 nn.4-7 (Colo. 1988) (surveying commitment
standards throughout the country).
30. Cf. Paul Appelbaum & Robert Hamm, Decision to Seek Commitment: Psychiatric
Decision Making in a Legal Context, 39 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 447, 447 (1982)
(presenting an empirical study that found a substantial percentage of patients for whom
psychiatrists applied for commitment did not meet the criteria for commitment); see also infra
notes 104-30 and accompanying text.
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kind of vigorous advocacy needed to serve as a check on unfettered clinical
discretion. Also, this article will explain why the inherently vague meaning
of danger further serves to permit clinicians to exercise unfettered
discretion in the commitment process. Indeed, without narrowing concepts,
the meaning of “dangerous” is sufficiently ambiguous as to contravene
notions of due process.
This article then offers a number of suggestions to lessen the influence
of unchecked psychiatric assessments of danger. First, doctors should
engage in more structured risk evaluations by necessarily focusing on
empirically based criteria when conducting assessments of danger. Next,
when a patient challenges his or her hospitalization, due process requires
courts to promptly appoint expert assistance at the commitment hearing. In
addition, psychiatrists’ lack of ability to assess risk means courts should not
permit psychiatrists to render opinions about an individual’s dangerousness,
at least when these experts base their opinions on clinical judgment alone.
Furthermore, lawyers for patients in the commitment process should
systematically appeal adverse decisions for the simple reason that only
appellate case law can narrow and clarify the ambiguous concept of danger.
Finally, a word of candor. The views expressed in this article have
been shaped by my work experience: first as an attorney for the New York
Mental Hygiene Legal Service, representing patients in the civil commitment process; and then as the supervising attorney of a law school clinical
program that is funded pursuant to the Protection and Advocacy for
Individuals with Mental Illness Act.31 In the latter role, I am the attorney
for the plaintiff class in Monaco v. Hogan32 and was the attorney for the
plaintiff class in Goetz v. Crosson,33 two cases discussed in this article.
However, I have tried to insure that any position I have taken is supported
by both the law and professional literature and is not simply a reflection of
observations. If anyone disagrees, by all means, respond.
In addition, I attempted to gather empirical data on the civil commitment process. Over a ten-year period, information was gathered from
Suffolk, Queens, and Kings Counties in New York; Dade County in
Florida; and Cook, Kane, Madison, and Union Counties in Illinois. These
counties were chosen simply as a function of finding an individual who was
31. See generally Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act, 42
U.S.C. ch. 114 (1986). The PAIMI Act authorizes the provision of legal actions on behalf of
individuals suffering, or having been diagnosed as suffering, from mental illness. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 10805(a)(1). The clinic has provided representation to individuals seeking damages who believe
that they have been wrongly involuntarily hospitalized, and the clinic has served as counsel in a
number of class actions challenging the civil commitment process.
32. 576 F. Supp. 2d 335 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
33. 967 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1992).
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in a position to observe the commitment process and willing to tabulate
what he or she observed. When pertinent, this article will detail the extent
to which the empirical findings support or refute contentions set forth in the
literature.
II. UNDERSTANDING WHAT A DETERMINATION OF
DANGEROUSNESS ENTAILS
More than a little confusion exists over what it means to be dangerous.34 The dictionary defines dangerous as able or likely to inflict injury
and involving the chance of loss or injury.35 Accordingly, a determination
of dangerousness is a statement of probability.36 Hence, it makes little
sense to speak of a “prediction of dangerousness.” When one predicts, one
states whether an event will occur.37 A bookmaker assesses the odds of an
underdog beating the favorite; a gambler predicts who will win when
placing a bet.
The confusion about the meaning of dangerous has arisen from many
sources. The Supreme Court contributed to this confusion when it noted the
impracticality of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in the civil commitment context because of the difficulty in proving “that an individual is
both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous.”38 This text certainly suggests
the Court equated the concept of danger as the causing of harm. This is so
because it should not be particularly difficult for a committing hospital to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt a person is likely to cause harm. Other
courts also have contributed to this confusion, concluding the Fourth
Amendment requires a probability or substantial chance of dangerousness,

34. See, e.g., Randy K. Otto, On the Ability of Mental Health Professionals to “Predict
Dangerousness”: A Commentary on Interpretations of the “Dangerousness” Literature, 18 LAW
& PSYCHOL. REV. 43, 43 n.1 (1994).
35. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 573 (1993).
36. See, e.g., John Monahan & David Wexler, A Definite Maybe: Proof and Probability in
Civil Commitment 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 38 (1978); see also Gary Gleb, Comment,
Washington’s Sexually Violent Predator Law: The Need to Bar Unreliable Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness from Civil Commitment Proceedings, 39 UCLA L. REV. 213, 226 (1991)
(distinguishing between assessment of probability and prediction of harm).
37. See Henry J. Steadman, From Dangerousness to Risk Assessment of Community
Violence: Taking Stock at the Turn of the Century, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 265, 266-67
(2000) (recognizing that assessment of danger has moved from a prediction of a future event to a
probability assessment).
38. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S 418, 429 (1979) (emphasis added). If one recognizes the
concept of danger is an assessment of risk, then the Supreme Court clearly erred. It is certainly
possible to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual poses a significant risk of causing
harm. See In re Commitment of Kientz, 597 N.W.2d 712, 718 (Wis. 1999) (holding the state
proved beyond a reasonable doubt it was much more likely than not the committee would engage
in future acts of violence).
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as opposed to harm-causing, behavior.39 Courts that have questioned the
ability of psychiatrists to “predict danger” have also contributed to the
confusion.40
Empirical scholarship that has attempted to assess the ability of
psychiatrists to accurately assess dangerousness has also contributed to the
confusion. Empirical studies have attempted to assess the ability of mental
health professionals to accurately assess danger by tracking mentally ill
individuals previously assessed as dangerous to determine whether these
people have caused harm.41 The studies have simply applied elementary
statistical principles. When one has determined a high probability of an
event occurring exists, the failure of the event to take place does not mean
the prognosticator made an incorrect assessment of risk. On the other hand,
an examination of a statistically significant number of events—specifically,
determinations that a person is at a significant risk of causing harm—will
provide information about the ability of mental health professionals to
accurately assess the likelihood of harm-causing behavior.42 Because these
studies have focused on a statistically significant number of individuals, it
is not particularly inappropriate for the authors of these studies to ask
whether mental health professionals possess the ability to “predict behaveior” of a statistically significant number of individuals. However, these
studies and the use of the word “prediction” may well have created the
impression an individualized assessment of danger requires a determination
of whether someone will cause harm; it does not.

39. See Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1102 (6th Cir. 1997); Waananen v. Barry, 343 F.
Supp. 2d 161, 171 (D. Conn. 2004); Hoffman v. Cnty. of Del., 41 F. Supp. 2d 195, 209 (N.D.N.Y.
1999). A few legislatures and courts have authorized civil commitment when an individual is
likely to be dangerous. These holdings amount to a directive to determine whether the civil
commitment subject is likely to likely cause harm.
40. See, e.g., In re Cochran, 487 N.E.2d 389, 390-92 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (commenting on the
inexact nature of “predicting future dangerousness”); Conservatorship of Roulet, 590 P.2d 1, 7
(Cal. 1979).
41. See, e.g., Charles W. Lidz et al., The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence to Others, 269
JAMA 1007, 1008 (1993); Dale McNeil & Renee Binder, Clinical Assessment of the Risk of
Violence Among Psychiatric Inpatients, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1317, 1318 (1991).
42. See Alexander Scherr, Daubert & Danger: The “Fit” of Expert Predictions in Civil
Commitments, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 23 (2003).
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III. THE ABILITY OF PSYCHIATRISTS TO ASSESS RISK: WHAT
WE DO AND DO NOT KNOW
A. THE DEGREE OF PROFICIENCY IN ASSESSING RISK OF HARM
Two generations of researchers have examined dangerousness assessments conducted by mental health professionals.43 Authorities in legal and
medical journals have detailed, with much empirical support, that
psychiatrists lack the ability to assess danger proficiently.44 This lack of
skill has resulted in mental health professionals overpredicting instances of
harmful behavior.45 Accordingly, while the leading scholar on risk assessment, John Monahan, has concluded analysis of current risk assessment
literature “suggests that clinicians are able to distinguish violent from
nonviolent patients with a modest, better-than-chance level of accuracy,”46
he has also concluded little has transpired to inspire confidence in mental

43. See Daniel A. Krauss et al., Beyond Prediction to Explanation in Risk Assessment
Research, 23 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 91, 110 (2000).
44. See, e.g., Bruce A. Arrigo, Paternalism, Civil Commitment and Illness Politics:
Assessing the Current Debate and Outlining a Future Direction, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 131, 144
(1992-93) (discussing how studies demonstrate a “low rate of accurate predictions of dangerousness” and “harmless persons are routinely diagnosed as dangerous”); Herbert A. Eastman,
Metaphor and Madness, Law and Liberty, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 281, 341 (1991) (stating “journals
are replete with studies confirming the unreliability of psychiatrists’ predictions as to dangerousness”); Lidz et al., supra note 41, at 1009-10 (noting that while an empirical study indicated
clinicians can predict dangerousness at better-than-chance level, the relatively low numbers of
accurate assessments of harm demonstrate clinicians are relatively inaccurate predictors of
violence); Judith S. Thompson & Joel W. Ager, An Experimental Analysis of the Civil
Commitment Recommendations of Psychologists and Psychiatrists, 6 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 119, 120
(1988) (“Although some experts disagree . . ., the common interpretation of this literature is that
mental health professionals are no better able to predict dangerousness than laymen.”).
45. See David B. Wexler, The Structure of Civil Commitment: Patterns, Pressures, and
Interactions in Mental Health Legislation, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 3 (1983); see also Deidre
Klassen & William A. O’Connor, A Prospective Study of Predictors of Violence in Adult Male
Mental Health Admissions, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 143, 144 (1988) (discussing a number of
studies on clinical assessments of danger found false positive rates ranging from sixty-five to
eighty-six percent). When mental health professionals err, the most common error consists of a
false positive, a conclusion that a person is dangerous when he or she is not. See Randy K. Otto,
Prediction of Dangerous Behavior: A Review and Analysis of “Second-Generation” Research, 5
FORENSIC REP. 103, 128 (1992).
46. John Monahan, Violence Risk Assessment:
Scientific Validity and Evidentiary
Admissibility, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 901, 915 (2000); see also Randy Borum, Improving the
Clinical Practice of Violence Risk Assessment: Technology, Guidelines, and Training, 51 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 945, 946 (1996) (stating a number of authorities believe mental health
professionals have at least a modest ability to predict violence; predictions of violence are significantly more accurate than chance); Michael A. Norko, Commentary: Dangerousness—A Failed
Paradigm for Clinical Practice and Service Delivery, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 282,
286 (2000) (providing the accuracy of assessments of danger by psychiatrists is only modestly
better-than-chance).
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health professionals using “unstructured clinical judgment to accurately
assess violence risk.”47
One must further recognize that studies that have helped establish
empirical data relating to harm causing behavior, which help to improve the
accuracy of assessments of danger made by those professionals who
carefully apply the data, have often focused on groups of individuals who
previously engaged in criminal conduct.48 The risk factors inherent in this
population do not necessarily exist in the class of civil committees deemed
to pose a danger to others as a result of mental illness.49 Hence, clinicians
who wish to rely on empirical data when assessing civil committees for the
risk of violence may have less to guide the assessment process than do
clinicians who assess insanity acquittees or other population of individuals
who have committed criminal acts.
Similarly, research indicates psychiatrists lack the ability to accurately
assess the risk posed by possible suicidal behavior,50 primarily because
clinicians fail to take into account the low base rate of suicide.51 As one
authority has noted, mental health professionals “do not possess any item of
information or any combination of items that permit us to identify to a
useful degree the particular persons who will commit suicide, in spite of the
fact that we do have scores of items available, each of which is significantly
related to suicide.”52 Furthermore, a substantial percentage, if not a majority, of cases in which psychiatrists label a patient as dangerous in the civil
commitment context involve instances in which a psychiatrist opines a
patient is dangerous because of an inability to meet his or her basic needs.53
47. John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 406-07 (2006). One can argue that while
most studies involving the ability of mental health professionals to assess violence risk involve
long-term risk of harm, while a decision to civilly commit a mentally ill individual amounts to a
qualitatively different decision because it involves an assessment of short-term risk. See John
Monahan, Prediction Research and the Emergency Commitment of Dangerous Mentally Ill
Persons: A Reconsideration, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 198, 200 (1978). While some research
indicates mental health professionals can assess violence on a short-term basis better than
originally thought, see Otto, supra note 45, at 129, a review of the studies details only one-in-two
predictions of short-term behavior are correct. See id. at 130.
48. See R. Karl Hanson, What Do We Know About Sex Offender Risk Assessment?, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 50, 50 (1998).
49. Id. (citing factors including history or criminal behavior and antisocial personality).
50. MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 326.
51. Id.
52. Id. (quoting Alex D. Pokorny, Prediction of Suicide in Psychiatric Patients: Report of a
Prospective Study, 40 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 249, 257 (1983)).
53. See Eric Turkheimer & Charles D.H. Parry, Why the Gap? Practice and Policy in Civil
Commitment Hearings, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 646, 648 (1992) (stating in an empirical study,
seventy-eight percent of initial commitments and ninety-four percent of recommitments are based
on a grave disability standard, the equivalent of an inability to meet needs standard); Virginia
Aldigé Hiday & Lynn Newhart Smith, Effects of the Dangerousness Standard in Civil Commit-
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A survey of literature relating to risk assessment details a complete absence
of empirical literature validating psychiatrists’ ability to accurately assess
harm based on an inability to meet basic needs.54
As a result, no one knows whether psychiatrists possess any proficiency in determining whether patients pose a risk to themselves because of
an inability to meet their basic needs. The absence of literature relating to
an inability to meet basic needs will no doubt result in far less discussion
about this type of risk assessment. It will also result in the continuation of
psychiatric evaluations in an unchecked manner because, in the absence of
any literature on this topic, an unstated assumption exists that psychiatrists
can accurately assess whether a person lacks the ability to meet his or her
needs. However, the well-documented problems with the exercise of clinical judgment and the other non-clinical factors that adversely impact clinical judgment55 indicate any such assumption more than likely will prove
false.56
B. WHY PSYCHIATRISTS ERR WHEN ASSESSING RISK
1.

The Indiscriminate Use of Clinical Judgment

While psychiatrists routinely rely on their clinical judgments to reach
conclusions about dangerousness,57 statistical studies have demonstrated
that assessments of risk based on empirical data are more accurate than the
clinical method.58 In other words, in all cases of comparison, statistical
ment, 15 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 433, 441-42 (1988) (noting when civil committees failed to engage
in harm-causing behavior, psychiatrists opined the committees lacked the ability to meet their
basic needs).
54. See, e.g., MICHAEL PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 104-21
(2d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2008); see also Turkheimer & Parry, supra note 53, at 648, 651 (discussing
danger based on an inability to meet needs “has attracted little theoretical or scientific attention;”
studies of assessments of inability to meet needs have not been undertaken).
55. See infra notes 57-90 and accompanying text.
56. This is particularly true because, while ample literature exists informing clinicians of
what factors empirically related to harm-causing behavior a clinician should evaluate, this author
is not aware of any literature providing clinicians with empirically-based information relating to
individuals placing themselves at significant risk because of thinking so disorganized they cannot
meet their basic needs. If, even with the existence of professional literature, medical schools and
hospitals have lacked the ability to train psychiatrists to adequately assess individuals’ risk of
violence, what basis exists to believe psychiatrists have been adequately trained to assess an
inability to meet basic needs?
57. See Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment With
Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1444,
1454, 1497 (2003).
58. See William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective,
Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The ClinicalStatistical Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 293, 293, 298 (1996); Monahan, supra note
47, at 407-08; see Janus & Prentky, supra note 57, at 1444, 1454 (noting in only eight cases of
128 did the clinical method out-perform the actuarial assessments). The clinical method involves
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predictions were superior to clinical predictions, and statistical predictions
yielded relatively lower false positive rates.59
When assessing risk based on clinical judgment alone, psychiatrists
often fail to act in a properly systematic manner when gathering information necessary to accurately assess risk.60 Instead, the exercise of clinical
judgment related to an assessment of risk may well depend on murky and
ambiguous clinical hunches.61 Accordingly, one must recognize the exercise of clinical judgment alone produces uneducated and uninformed
decisions.62 Notwithstanding the failures and antiquated nature of the
unstructured clinical judgment process, only a minority, and maybe a small
minority, of mental health professionals employ structured risk assessment
techniques.63
Perhaps the use of clinical judgment alone produces the errors it does
because, despite advances in knowledge about the risk of violence by
people with mental illness, there have been virtually no systematic efforts to
incorporate the information into a useful, empirically-based framework for
clinical assessment. Legal constraints may require clinicians to use empirical data to guide the evaluation process because due process requires clinicians to conduct civil commitment evaluations pursuant to standards that
promote some degree of accuracy.64 Accordingly, mental health professsionals must integrate the almost separate worlds of research on the
assessment of violence risk with clinical practices on a day-to-day basis to
an evaluator utilizing his or her own intuitive judgment after considering any information deemed
appropriate. See Grove & Meehl, supra, at 293.
59. Klassen & O’Connor, supra note 45, at 144; see also Hanson, supra note 48, at 54, 61-63
(describing the accuracy of clinical assessments of danger as “unimpressive,” while approaches
that direct clinicians to consider empirically-based factors provide greater accuracy); Grant T.
Harris & Marnie E. Rice, Risk Appraisal and Management of Violent Behavior, 48 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES 1168, 1169 (1997) (stating actuarial methods constantly outperform professional judgment in assessment of danger); Thomas Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments of
Dangerousness, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 409, 409 (2001) (noting numerous authorities
recognize actuarial assessments of risk have been proven superior to unstructured clinical
assessments).
Admittedly, much of the literature challenging the efficacy of clinical judgment addressed the
ability of clinicians to “predict” harm as opposed to assessing risk. See, e.g., Grove & Meehl,
supra note 58, at 299. However, any prediction of harm-causing behavior is based on an
assessment of risk. Hence, if actuarial methodology produces greater accuracy in the predictive
process than clinical judgment, then actuarial methods provide a more accurate picture of the level
of risk posed in comparison to clinical judgment.
60. See In re R.S., 773 A.2d 72, 80-81 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
61. See Douglas Mossman, Commentary: Assessing the Risk of Violence—Are “Accurate”
Predictions Useful?, 28 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 272, 277 (2000).
62. Litwack, supra note 59, at 413.
63. John Monahan, Tarasoff at Thirty: How Developments in Science and Policy Shape the
Common Law, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 497, 513-14 (2006).
64. See Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1062 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding due
process requires clinicians to make commitment decisions that promise some degree of accuracy).
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enhance the accuracy of civil commitment evaluations.65 The need for
judicial scrutiny of the evaluation process might be alleviated to one degree
or another by the careful dissemination of risk assessment information
within hospitals. If hospital administration provided better education to
clinical staff on this issue, clinicians would engage in more accurate
examinations of patients.66
However, as noted, posing a risk of harm to others is but one way a
mentally ill individual can satisfy a dangerousness requirement. Indeed, in
all likelihood, posing a danger to others is not the contention relied upon by
psychiatrists to justify civil commitment in a majority of instances.67
Rather, people can put themselves in serious danger of harm by showing:
an inability to meet their basic needs of food, clothing and shelter;68 an
inability to meet their medical needs;69 behavior that can provoke others to
retaliate and use force against the civil commitment subjects;70 or a lack of
judgment to such a degree the civil commitment subjects may well place
themselves in a harm-producing situation.71 Unlike assessments of risk to
others, which are aided by two generations of empirical study,72 judges and
mental health professionals must wait for the first set of data relating to how
clinicians can more accurately assess whether mentally ill individuals pose
a threat of harm to themselves because of an inability to meet their basic
needs.

65. Borum, supra note 46, at 947.
66. For example, in Monaco v. Stone, the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation
(HHC) settled a lawsuit that alleged psychiatrists in all facilities in New York state, operated by
state and local authorities, confined nondangerous patients because psychiatrists wanted to treat
nondangerous patients whose clinical condition nevertheless warranted inpatient care. Stipulation
and Order of Settlement, Monaco v. Carpinello, No. CV-98-3386, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85689,
at docket entry 326, attachment 1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2006). This settlement can be viewed at
http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov through the PACER system, which requires the purchase of a
PACER number. In this settlement, HHC agreed to provide education and training to all
psychiatrists who conducted civil commitment evaluations and directed the initial examining
physician to evaluate as many as forty-three risk factors relating to violence, suicide, and an
inability to meet needs, as well as factors that mitigate the risk of harm. Id.
67. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
68. D.J. v. State, 59 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. App. 2001); Boggs v. New York City Health &
Hosps. Corp., 523 N.Y.S.2d 71, 85 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
69. See, e.g., Armstrong v. State, 190 S.W.3d 246, 249 (Tex. App. 2006).
70. See, e.g., In re Maxwell, 703 P.2d 574, 576 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
71. See, e.g., Boggs, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 85 (addressing a civil commitment subject running into
traffic); County Attorney v. Kaplan, 605 P.2d 912, 914 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (discussing driving
the wrong way on a freeway).
72. See Krauss, supra note 43, at 110.
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2. Non-Clinical Reasons Why Clinicians Render Inaccurate
and Unreliable Assessments of Dangerousness
Numerous reasons exist for a lack of significant proficiency in the area
of risk assessment that do not relate directly to the evaluation process.
First, the medical imperative is to presume sickness, and this occurs when
doctors examine patients for civil commitment purposes.73 When a psychiatrist evaluates an individual in a psychiatric emergency room, the nebulous
criteria for various mental illnesses within the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual–IV often makes it difficult for the subject of the evaluation to rebut
the presumption of illness that exists when one is brought to the emergency
74
room, which enables the psychiatrist to find an illness when it does not
75
exist.
Psychiatrists’ biases toward treatment constitute another reason why
doctors inaccurately assess the likelihood of harmful behavior:
Treatment bias refers to the professional attitude that incorrect failure to treat is a greater error than treating unnecessarily. Mental
health professionals are well-meaning clinicians whose whole
training orients them to find problems and remedy them. Thus,
they tend to overdiagnose and overpredict. This is perhaps
especially true in the mental health field where there are fewer
objective criteria of illness and less prognostic knowledge than in
physical medicine.76
73. Arrigo, supra note 44, at 144. Hence, it is not surprising one study found when individuals attempted to facilitate involuntary hospitalization of another person, they often exaggerated
the dangerousness of the subject of commitment. When this occurred, psychiatrists assumed the
behavior set forth in the petition even when the commitment subject denied it and the court later
found no evidence of such conduct. Hiday, supra note 5, at 658.
74. See In re Goodwin, 366 N.W.2d 809, 813 (N.D. 1985). The Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual-IV is a text published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) that sets forth the
criteria the APA has established for various forms of mental illness. To illustrate the difficulty in
interpreting behavior as symptomatic of mental illness, one needs to look at some of the criteria
for mania. These include the following: an inflated self-esteem or grandiosity; becoming more
talkative than usual; an increase in goal-directed activity; and excessive involvement in pleasurable activities. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 362 (Am.
Psych. Ass’n ed., 4th ed. text rev. 2000). Very often, it is nearly impossible for a psychiatrist
examining a patient in a psychiatric emergency room to accurately determine whether these
criteria exist. At what point does an explanation of a person’s life become grandiose? How does
a clinician demarcate the point at which an increase in pleasurable activities becomes symptomatic
of mental illness?
75. Bruce A. Arrigo & Christopher Williams, Chaos Theory and the Social Control Thesis:
A Post Foucauldian Analysis of Mental Illness and Involuntary Civil Confinement, 26 SOC. JUST.
177, 187 (1999).
76. Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health
Law, 51 SO. CAL. L. REV. 527, 599 (1978); see also Robert L. Goldstein, Hiring the Hired Gun:
Lawyers and Their Psychiatric Experts, 11 LEGAL STU. FORUM 41, 41 (1987) (recognizing how
value systems and ideological leanings can bias what purportedly constitutes an impartial
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Accordingly, a number of studies have found incorrect assessments of
harm-causing behavior are a function of doctors labeling an individual
dangerous as a means of ensuring treatment.77
Next, a concern for liability can impact a clinician’s decision-making
in the commitment context because it can create a conflict with the goal of
committing only those individuals who, after a careful assessment and application of clinically appropriate criteria, meet the commitment standard.78
When this occurs, clinicians err on the side of protection from liability.79
Beyond a direct fear of liability, psychiatrists are inclined to err on the
side of safety and caution when assessing dangerousness.80 Physicians are
trained to act cautiously and to operate under a theory of when in doubt,
provide treatment.81 The psychiatrist who fails to accurately assess a dangerous patient and authorizes the release or suggests a court release a mentally ill individual who subsequently engages in harm-causing behavior will
be subject to severe criticism. On the other hand, if the psychiatrist incorrectly assesses a nondangerous individual as dangerous, he will suffer no
consequences. The psychiatrist’s assessment of likely harm-causing behavior cannot be challenged because no one knows whether harm would have
occurred if the doctor did not authorize coercive clinical intervention.82
Thus, both the public and the committing psychiatrist will rarely, if ever,
psychiatric assessment); David B. Wexler & Stanley E. Scoville, The Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 100-01 (1973) (stating doctors
recognize that, while it is probably illegal, they disregard a strict application of the dangerousness
standard in favor of a “best interests of the patient standard” because they believe it is more
humanitarian to provide treatment than to be statutorily thwarted in the provision of treatment).
77. See Edward P. Mulvey & Charles W. Lidz, Back to Basics: A Critical Analysis of
Dangerousness Research in a New Environment, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 209, 214 (1985) (citing
Appelbaum & Hamm, supra note 30; John Monahan & Leslie Cummings, The Prediction of
Dangerousness as a Function of its Perceived Consequences, 2 J. CRIM. JUST. 239 (1975)).
Another study found decisions to commit were influenced primarily by the degree of psychiatric
impairment manifested and not the level of risk posed by the civil committee. See Lois Pokorny
et al., Dangerousness and Disability as Predictors of Psychiatric Patients’ Legal Status, 17
BEHAV. SCI. L. 253, 264 (1999). In a different legal setting, one study found a recognition that an
individual should receive needed treatment impacted assessments of a defendant’s competence to
stand trial. See Grant Morris et al., Competency to Stand Trial, 4 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
193, 222 (2004).
.
78 Paul Appelbaum, Civil Commitment from a Systems Perspective, 16 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 61, 65 (1992).
79. Id. at 65-66.
80. Arrigo & Williams, supra note 75, at 184-90 (stating the “‘better safe than sorry’ climate
of the medical community is responsible for ceaseless numbers of perfectly harmless individuals
routinely being diagnosed as ‘dangerous’ and consequently subjected to involuntary confinement”); Arrigo, supra note 44, at 144.
81. See Janus & Prentky, supra note 57, at 1458 n.85.
82. See Bernard Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
439, 447 (1974); see also MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 348 (noting the decision to release a
patient can produce disastrous consequences for a clinician who releases a patient who causes
harm).
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learn about an incorrect assessment of dangerousness, but they will always
learn about an incorrect assessment of nondangerousness.83
For these reasons, it is not uncommon for psychiatrists to determine
civil commitment is warranted for further evaluation of a patient.84 When
psychiatrists believe it is appropriate to involuntarily hospitalize someone
when a question exists as to whether a patient meets the civil commitment
criteria, little incentive exists for the clinician to gather all necessary information in the emergency room, which is needed to make a careful assessment. Rather, doctors can, and will, develop an attitude of commit first,
and gather all pertinent information later.85 The busier the emergency
room, the easier it becomes for doctors to develop this attitude.
The lack of risk assessment training in medical school further adversely
impacts a doctor’s ability to assess the likelihood of risk-causing behavior.86
One study found only forty percent of graduate programs offered any formal training in the study of suicide.87 Because diagnosing mental illness
focuses on symptoms and behaviors that differ from many risk assessment
criteria, the diagnostic skills a clinician learns in medical school are of
limited utility when assessing dangerousness.88 Finally, the lack of fluency
in English of foreign-born doctors and the concomitant inability to fully
understand statements and to otherwise communicate effectively with the
individuals they assess contribute to inaccurate assessments of danger.89
The physician who is unable to grasp the meaning of statements made by

83. Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise:
Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 712 n.57 (1974).
84. Discovery in Monaco v. Hogan, a lawsuit that challenged the adequacy and pretextual
nature of psychiatric evaluations, illustrates the nature of this problem. In a review of twenty of
these involuntarily hospitalized individuals, seven were committed when psychiatrists concluded
further evaluation was necessary. Certificate of P.C. dated September 30, 2006; Certificate of
R.C. dated June 7, 2007; Certificate of M.C. dated June 27, 2008; Certificate of B.C. dated
February 10, 2006; Certificate of C.O. dated November 9, 2007; Certificate of M.M. dated May
11, 2007; Certificate of K.S. dated June 6, 2007. Certifications on file with the author.
85. In Monaco, the following exchange occurred between counsel and a committing physician in a deposition in which the physician conceded the prevailing philosophy at his hospital was
commit first and ask questions later: “Q. ‘Fair to say you, the prevailing philosophy is certif[y]
first and then attempt to get the information, one about the patient, and two, alternative forms of
care and treatment?’ A. ‘Yeah, that’s [the] philosophy, yeah.’” Declaration of William Brooks,
Exhibit N at 122-23, Docket Entry 418.
86. Borum, supra note 46, at 953-54 (noting it is questionable whether the mental health
profession is adequately training clinicians to properly evaluate an individual’s potential for
violence).
87. Id.
88. Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 129 (1984).
89. See Bradley McGraw et al., Civil Commitment in New York City: An Analysis of
Practice, 5 PACE L. REV. 259, 277 (1985); Richard Van Duizend & Joel Zimmerman, The
Involuntary Civil Commitment Process in Chicago: Practices and Procedures, 33 DEPAUL L.
REV. 225, 247 (1984).

2010]

THE TAIL STILL WAGS THE DOG

277

the patient is likely to misinterpret a patient’s statements and, hence, reach a
diagnosis that lacks accuracy.90
C. BEYOND A LACK OF COMPETENCE IN THE ASSESSMENT PROCESS
—THE PRETEXTUAL NATURE OF PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATIONS
As former District of Columbia Circuit Judge David Bazelon found,
the personal biases of psychiatrists can drive their decision-making.91 The
excessively vague nature of the concept of danger92 has created an
opportunity for psychiatrists to ignore, to a very significant degree, the
constraints the law has attempted to place on their discretion.93 Decisions
such as O’Connor v. Donaldson and those that imposed more stringent
substantive commitment standards and provided broader procedural safeguards, generated significant hostility from the psychiatric profession; the
profession viewed judicial decisions that limited their clinical discretion as
an encroachment on their professional prerogative.94 One psychiatrist
asserted mentally ill individuals were “[r]otting with their rights on,” a
phrase that reflected frustration by psychiatrists with being forced to withhold treatment they deemed necessary.95 Many psychiatrists believe they
know best and any limitations placed upon their ability to impose clinically
indicated treatment, whether imposed by the courts or the legislatures, constitute bad policy that causes more harm than good.96 As one group of
physicians noted:
90. See McGraw et al., supra note 89, at 277; Van Duizend & Zimmerman, supra note 89, at
247.
91. See David L. Bazelon, The Dilemma of Criminal Responsibility, 72 KY. L.J. 263, 274
(1983-84).
92. See infra notes 183-214 and accompanying text.
93. It is fair to ask what difference exists between a decision to commit that is influenced by
a treatment bias, see supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text, and a pretextual decision that a
patient is dangerous. A pretextual decision is more result-oriented; the psychiatrist knows the
result he or she wants and documents clinical findings that support the result sought when the
overarching goal of the evaluation is to determine whether the patient’s clinical condition warrants
inpatient treatment. A commitment decision unduly influenced by treatment bias is less dishonest.
Physicians may not realize biases they have are impacting the decisions they must make.
94. See MICHAEL PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE 85 (Bruce D. Sales et al. eds., 2000).
95. Eastman, supra note 44, at 315; see also MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 816 n.271
(“[M]ental health professionals perceive legalistic laws as an unnecessary constraint in the
treatment of mentally ill persons.”).
96. As one psychiatrist noted, “The need to demonstrate dangerousness . . . promotes a
galling kind of hypocrisy when, in order to effect a necessary commitment, dangerousness must
be invented or exaggerated.” Paul Chodoff, Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill as a
Moral Issue, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 384, 386 (1984); see also Rael Jean Isaac, Protect the
Mentally Ill From Their Advocates, WALL ST. J., May 7, 1991, at A22; H. Richard Lamb,
Involuntary Treatment of the Homeless Mentally Ill, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y
269, 277 (1989); Norko, supra note 46, at 288 (stating the dangerousness requirement should be
changed to a criterion that better supports clinical reality in which doctors act like doctors); Darold
Treffert, The Obviously Ill Patient in Need of Treatment: A Fourth Standard for Civil Commi-
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Emergency involuntary hospitalization procedures have become
adversary in form and function, with lawyers who have no training
in psychiatry whatsoever forcing their views on doctors who have
an entirely different perspective in their approach to the mentally
ill . . . . They should leave the practice of psychiatry to those who
have had experience in the field—not on or around the bench.97
Comments like this reflect a view of some psychiatrists that attempts by
lawyers to strengthen individual rights in the civil commitment process
amount to a “legal onslaught” or “holy legal war” against the system of
public psychiatry.98
Psychiatrists are authoritarian in nature and more comfortable with
compulsory treatment than nonmedical mental health professionals;99 they
support broader grounds for commitment than other mental health professionals.100 The authoritarian nature of many psychiatrists has produced a
value system that de-emphasizes individual liberty and autonomy. The authoritarian nature of many psychiatrists has produced a hostility and disrespect for those laws that have broadened the rights of civil committees.101
When stricter commitment laws conflict with deeply held values of
psychiatrists, the doctors give preference to their values at the expense of
compliance with the law.102 Indeed, one set of authorities gathering extensive literature has concluded, “The often flagrant failure to apply the legal
standards for civil commitment has been documented in numerous
jurisdictions.”103
The nebulous nature of the dangerousness requirement has enabled
psychiatrists to disregard the law while creating an appearance of
adherence. A finding of danger, unlike most other legal determinations,
does not require a conclusion that a particular act took place. Rather, a
psychiatrist need only conclude threat of harm is substantial enough to
warrant confinement.104 The psychiatrist who wishes to pay lip service to
the law, if for no other reason than to satisfy his or her conscience, can
tment, 36 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 259, 264 (1985) (“Changes in mental health law
have produced a pendulum swing . . . too harsh, too restrictive, and too unyielding.”).
97. Glenn C. Affleck, Michael A. Peszke & Ronald M. Wintrob, Psychiatrists’ Familiarity
with Legal Statutes Governing Emergency Involuntary Hospitalization, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
205, 209 (1978).
98. Arrigo, supra note 44, at 147.
99. See Eastman, supra note 44, at 344.
100. Robert Brooks, Psychiatrists’ Beliefs and Wants About Involuntary Civil Commitment
Grounds, 29 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 13, 14 (2006).
101. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
102. See Appelbaum, supra note 78, at 65.
103. MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 815 n.270.
104. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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always assert enough symptoms of mental illness or factors relating to
harm-causing behavior exist to justify confinement.105 The psychiatrist
who lacks respect for the law can simply act with impunity, knowing the
court system will rarely second guess his or her determination. Moreover,
relatively few individuals who suffer from mental illness have the
wherewithal or fortuity to find counsel who will file a damages lawsuit
when the facility, or in rare instances a court, releases a patient.106 In sum,
psychiatrists can engage in what can be fairly characterized as systematic
civil disobedience—continuing to hospitalize those individuals whose
clinical conditions they believe warrant in-patient treatment.
Numerous studies strongly suggest psychiatrists have flaunted the laws
that supposedly govern their clinical discretion by making assessments of
danger that are pretextual in nature. After commitment laws narrowed in
one jurisdiction, a physician reportedly stated, “Doctors will continue to
certify those whom they really believe should be certified; they will merely
learn a new language.”107 Studies of psychiatric admissions in many jurisdictions that promulgated stricter commitment standards substantiate this
contention.
Studies on the impact of commitment statutes suggest the statutes have
not had an impact on the number of admissions.108 An immediate decline
in involuntary admissions followed the passage of tighter commitment
statutes in Arkansas, Hawaii, Kansas, Nebraska, North Carolina, and
109
However, these jurisdictions reported an increase in
Ontario, Canada.
110
Similar
involuntary commitments in the second and subsequent years.
reversals occurred in Florida, Pennsylvania, New Mexico, North Dakota,
111
Texas, and Washington.
Minnesota and California experienced an initial increase, and only
Massachusetts and Michigan sustained decreases in involuntary hospitalizations.112 Studies further indicated these reversals could not be attributed
to more frequent readmissions of patients who may have been released as a

105. See Grant Morris, Defining Dangerousness: Risking a Dangerous Definition, 10 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 61, 88 (1999) (noting how clinicians “apply their own, unchallenged
notions of committability to confine those who are deemed to need treatment”).
106. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
107. William O. McCormick, Involuntary Commitment in Ontario: Some Barriers to the
Provision of Proper Care, 124 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 715, 717 (1981).
108. MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 349.
109. R. Michael Bagby et al., Decision Making in Psychiatric Commitment: An
Experimental Analysis, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 28, 28 (1991).
110. Id. at 29.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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result of the implementation of tighter commitment standards.113 Hence, as
one authority found after studying admissions subsequent to amended commitment statutes, as many as half the committed individuals failed to satisfy
the criteria for commitment.114
Scrutiny of the details of the commitment process helps to clarify how
and why stricter commitment statutes do not produce fewer admissions.
Many authorities have found a desire to provide treatment, and not an intention to adhere to and apply the governing legal criteria, motivates decisions
by physicians who decide to hospitalize mentally ill individuals.115 It is not
difficult to reach this conclusion because studies detail a patient’s clinical
status, rather than an honest application of legal criteria, which drives
commitment decision-making.116 When this occurs, physicians will use an
assessment of dangerousness as a post-hoc justification for treatment.117 If
the ticket to involuntary hospitalization is an assessment of danger, “many

113. See Bagby, supra note 17, at 391.
114. Joseph Frueh, Note, The Anders Brief in Appeals from Civil Commitment, 118 YALE
L.J. 272, 303 (2008).
115. See Bagby et al., supra note 109, at 29, 32 (discussing a study that found highly treatable individuals are more likely to be committed than individuals characterized as not very
treatable); Renee L. Binder & Dale E. McNiel, Some Issues in Psychiatry, Psychology, and the
Law, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1192 (2008) (noting hospitalization can be viewed as an opportunity
to provide needed treatment). One study found psychiatrists are more likely to recommend
involuntary hospitalization when a patient suffers from schizophrenia or bipolar disorder than substance abuse. Brooks, supra note 100, at 14. Any study that finds that the diagnosis of a patient
serves as a basis for the decision to commit, as opposed to the level of risk posed by the patient,
suggests an interest in treating individuals with a particular diagnosis influences the commitment
decision-making process. See Appelbaum, supra note 78, at 65 (stating a desire to help those
perceived to be in need provides an explanation for what authorities have demonstrated: mental
health professional prioritize personal values over legal standards when conflict between the two
exists); Stewart Page, New Civil Commitment Legislation: The Relevance of Commitment
“Criteria”, 25 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 646, 646 (1980) (considering a study that found approximately seventy percent of commitments did not meet statutory criteria).
116. See Appelbaum, supra note 78, at 65; Bagby, supra note 17, at 385 (stating studies in
one jurisdiction found physicians failed to determine civil committees met the legal requirements
under the commitment provisions between eighty and ninety percent of the time in which the
physicians certified patients for involuntary hospitalization); Bagby et al., supra note 109, at 32
(noting twenty percent of patients that physicians recommended for commitment did not meet
legal criteria for involuntary hospitalization); Judith S. Thompson & Joel W. Ager, An
Experimental Analysis of the Civil Commitment Recommendations of Psychologists and
Psychiatrists, 6 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 119, 120 (1988) (discussing that empirical studies of physician’s familiarity with relevant statutes, or lack thereof, and adequacy of physician certification
forms support the contention that an application of commitment standards does not necessarily
govern psychiatrists’ decisions to seek commitment); see also Michael J. Leiber et al., A
Comparison of Pre-Reform and Post-Reform Civil Commitment Decisionmaking in Dane County
Wisconsin, 20 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT, 1, 22-23 (1993) (finding continued
adherence to clinical concerns in part to paternalistic considerations underlying commitment
decisions that the court in Lessard v. Schmidt sought to eliminate).
117. Mulvey & Lidz, supra note 77, at 217.
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psychiatrists . . . are willing to punch it.”118 In summary, when a psychiatrist evaluates a patient in the civil commitment context, a presumption of
illness exists,119 and if the patient fails to rebut this presumption, it may
well be that the clinician then applies a near irrefutable presumption of
dangerousness.
The conclusory nature and concomitant lack of detailed objective
criteria with much of the psychiatric diagnostic process enables psychiatrists to support assessments of danger when the patient’s mental status
would not justify this conclusion.120 To illustrate, the presence of paranoia
is a risk factor for danger.121 The psychiatric profession defines paranoia as
a pervasive distrust and suspiciousness of others such that their motives are
interpreted as malevolent.122 A civil committee may say his doctor is
“against” him or her because the patient wants to be released but the doctor
has decided otherwise. The doctor knows he or she is trying to help the
patient because he or she recognizes mental illness that requires treatment.
Accordingly, the doctor may conclude the patient manifests a false belief
system of a persecutory nature. When an honest application of legal criteria
no longer serves as the sole criteria for application of civil commitment
laws, not only does a desire to help and the patient’s clinical condition
influence dangerousness assessments, but so do other factors unrelated to
the assessment process. These include the availability of bed space and
insurance.123
How many psychiatrists assess numerous symptoms of mental illness,
such as delusions and hallucinations, illustrates how psychiatrists can
manipulate the diagnostic process to find danger where none exists. Professional literature has made clear no necessary correlation exists between the
presence of delusions or hallucinations and a heightened risk of harm.124
On the other hand, particular delusions and command hallucinations heighten the risk of harm posed by a person with mental illness.125 Psychiatrists
118. JOHN MONAHAN, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF
VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 51 (1981).
119. See Arrigo & Williams, supra note 75, at 187.
120. See Douglas Mossman, “Hired Guns,” “Whores,” and “Prostitutes”: Case Law
References to Clinicians of Ill Repute, 27 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 414 (1999)
(recognizing psychiatrists can mold testimony to further the litigation objectives of the party on
whose behalf the expert is testifying).
121. CHRISTOPHER WEBSTER ET AL., HCR-20: ASSESSING RISK FOR VIOLENCE 54 (1997).
122. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC GLOSSARY 100 (7th ed. 1994).
123. Nancy B. Engleman et al., Clinicians’ Decision Making About Involuntary
Commitment, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 941, 943-44 (1998); Herbert Sacks, Who’s on First,
What’s on Second, I Don’t Know’s on Third (For Profit Psychiatric Hospital Chains and the
Games They Play), PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Sept. 5, 1997, at 3.
124. See, e.g., Harris & Rice, supra note 59, at 1169.
125. Id.
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can, and will, justify a finding of danger on the basis that a patient manifests delusions or hallucinations, without specifying whether the delusions
or hallucinations are risk-enhancing.126
Tellingly, studies have documented a “remarkable degree of ignorance” of commitment criteria.127 Significantly, those psychiatrists who
certified the largest number of patients for involuntary hospitalization were
among the least knowledgeable about the law.128 If psychiatrists who
commit individuals are ignorant of the law, then considerations other than
the legal criteria that should govern their decisions guide their assessment
process. The handful of damages cases the author has worked on illustrates
126. Evidence presented in Monaco v. Hogan is instructive on this issue. See generally
Monaco v. Hogan, 576 F. Supp. 2d 335 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). In Monaco, the plaintiffs argued
psychiatrists confined individuals—regardless of whether the individuals were actually dangerous—for the purpose of providing needed treatment, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 351. In other words, some certifications of dangerousness are pretextual.
Discovery in Monaco revealed clinicians acknowledged that an intent to act on delusions or a
history of acting on delusions heightened the risk of harm even though delusions in and of themselves did not. See Declaration of William Brooks, Exhibit L at 126, 156, 198, Exhibit O at 4243, Exhibit P at 36, 70, Exhibit S at 69-71, Monaco, 576 F. Supp. 2d 335 (No. CV-98-3386),
available at http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov (search for “CV-98-3386”; then follow “Docket Entry
418”). Notwithstanding what should have constituted a need to differentiate between risk
enhancing delusions and hallucinations and delusions and hallucinations that were not, when the
plaintiffs came forth with voluminous instances of the failure of clinicians to make these
distinctions, see Declaration of William Brooks, Exhibit V, Exhibit W, Monaco, 576 F. Supp. 2d
335 (No. CV-98-3386), available at http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov (search for “CV-98-3386”;
then follow “Docket Entry 418”), the Office of Mental Health failed to come forth with one
instance in which a doctor who conducted a civil commitment evaluation justified a finding of
dangerousness based on a particular risk enhancing delusion or hallucination, as opposed to
finding dangerousness based on delusions or hallucinations in general. See Declaration of
Michael Peeples, Monaco, 576 F. Supp. 2d 335 (No. CV-98-3386), available at http://www.
nyed.uscourts.gov (search for “CV-98-3386”; then follow “Docket Entry 418”). Despite this
evidence, the court held because hospital physicians gave legitimate reasons for making
commitment decisions, the plaintiffs failed to prove their claim of pretextual confinement.
Monaco, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 353-54. The court further held the decisions of the physicians to
commit did not violate the substantive component of the Due Process Clause because the
commitments did not shock the conscience. Id. at 349-51. The court adopted the shocks the
conscience standard to ensure physicians can operate effectively when examining patients. Id. at
351. To the extent the court found any commitment of a nondangerous person is lawful as long it
does not shock the conscience, the court clearly erred. See Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134, 14445 (2d Cir. 2010) (rejecting the shocks the conscience standard in general and the Monaco court’s
decision as establishing the proper substantive due process framework for civil commitment). By
justifying the adoption of the shocks the conscience standard on the need to permit physicians to
operate effectively, the court conflated the governing substantive due process standard, which
prohibits the confinement of a nondangerous mentally ill individual and considerations underlying
the qualified immunity defense. See Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 352 (2006).
127. See Appelbaum, supra note 78, at 65. In one study where doctors’ knowledge of
commitment laws was explored, some thought patients must present an immediate, clear, or
imminent danger to self or others, while other doctors thought patients are committable if they
present a probable, possible, or potential danger; still other physicians thought only homicidal or
suicidal patients could be certified for emergency hospitalization, and self-destructive tendencies
could be a basis for commitment. See Affleck, Peszke & Wintrob, supra note 97, at 208.
128. See Affleck, Peszke & Wintrob, supra note 97, at 208.
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the problematic nature of the psychiatric evaluation process. Invariably,
questions have arisen about the seriousness of purpose in which one or
more clinicians have attempted to gather information from the plaintiff129 or
the adequacy of the evaluation as a result of the amount of time one or more
committing physicians has spent evaluating the plaintiff.130
Psychiatrists who examine individuals to determine whether they meet
a state’s civil commitment criteria have been designated by society to
temporarily replace the role of judges and become impartial factfinders who
must determine whether enough facts exists to deprive someone of a
fundamental liberty interest.131 When psychiatrists lack knowledge of the
law they must apply, no question exists that when committing individuals,
the psychiatrists think less about the legal constraints that must govern their
decision-making and more about other considerations they deem more
important than legal criteria.132 The attempts by the psychiatric profession
129. See, e.g., Declaration at ¶¶ 7-9, Jacob v. Bon Secours Charity Health System, Inc., No.
02 Civ. 1398 (BSJ) (RLE), 2008 WL 2216275 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2008) (detailing a lack of
interest in gathering information from the plaintiff after one physician discussed the case with the
plaintiff’s husband) (on file with author).
130. See Joint Appendix at 395, Marion v. LaFargue, 05-3797-cv, 186 Fed. Apps. 96 (2d Cir.
2006) (including a concession by the initial committing physician he may have spent as little as
five minutes evaluating the plaintiff) (on file with author); Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63,
67 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating the initial committing physician conducted a five minute interview);
Rodriguez v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1051, 1056 (2d Cir. 1995) (committing physician met
with the plaintiff for ten minutes); Bolmer v. Oliveira, 570 F. Supp. 2d 301, 309 (D. Conn. 2008)
(stating plaintiff alleged the certifying physician met with him for a few minutes and the admitting
physician for five minutes); Tewksbury v. Dowling, 169 F. Supp. 2d 103, 107 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)
(stating plaintiff asserted certifying physician never evaluated her; physician asserted he did so for
five minutes); Lubera v. Jewish Ass’n for Servs. for the Aged, No. 95 CIV. 7845 (DLC), 1996
WL 426375, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 1996) (indicating plaintiff was admitted to the hospital, as
evidenced by being thrown into shower, prior to any evaluation by a physician).
Demarco v. Sadiker, 897 F. Supp. 693 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), is particularly illuminating. In
Demarco, the plaintiff opposed a summary judgment motion on the ground that one of the
physicians never evaluated him and submitted an affidavit making this assertion. Id. at 703. The
defendant, citing, inter alia, a detailed admission note, and failing to recognize the contents of
such could have been produced by copying other documents, argued the plaintiff’s assertion was
simply too incredible for the court to believe. Id. at 703. Nevertheless, the court denied the physician qualified immunity and directed the parties to conduct limited discovery. Id. at 703-04.
During the deposition of the admitting physician, he acknowledged he first met the plaintiff at
12:45 p.m. See Declaration of Patricia Hingerton, Exhibit A, Demarco, 897 F. Supp. 693 (No. 93CV-5938 (ARR)). A review of the commitment certificate signed by the physician detailed that
the physician committed the plaintiff at 12:45 p.m., the time the physician first observed the
plaintiff. Id., Exhibit 4. When questioned about the certification of the plaintiff at the moment the
physician first observed him, the physician responded the plaintiff was angry, agitated, and
paranoid, and that the plaintiff threatened to sue on the ground of false imprisonment. Id. at 76. If
the handful of cases the author has litigated invariably contain evidence of significant deficiencies
with the evaluation process, and if one extrapolates to the approximate one million involuntary
hospitalizations that occur annually, see supra note 1 and accompanying text, one can imagine the
number of problematic evaluations that occur each year.
131. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992).
132. See Appelbaum, supra note 78, at 65.
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to involuntarily hospitalize nondangerous individuals have been described
as a “blatant attempt to aggregate power, to subvert the law, and to privilege
expertise over all competing social values.”133 In the 1950s, when school
administrators attempted to flout the integration requirements imposed by
the Supreme Court, their civil disobedience made news headlines, and
many within the country, including courts and the news media, eventually
denounced what amounted to an attempt to elevate what school officials
134
believed constituted the proper set of values over the rule of law. Many
psychiatrists have done the same with little outcry. Leaving aside the
culpability of the psychiatrists who have subverted the law, fault also lies
with lawyers for civilly committed individuals and with the judges who
have abdicated their judicial decision-making role to the purported experts
who appear before them.
IV. THE INABILITY OF CIVIL COMMITMENT HEARINGS TO
SERVE AS A CHECK ON FAULTY
PSYCHIATRIC DECISION-MAKING
A. THE DEFERENCE TO PSYCHIATRISTS BY JUDGES
The role a psychiatrist plays in the civil commitment process is truly
sui generis. When psychiatrists enter a courtroom, they are often defending
their decisions to involuntarily hospitalize a mentally ill individual. When
this occurs, the psychiatrists, for all intents and purposes, is the real party in
interest.135 In instances when the psychiatric expert testifies in connection
with a patient whom another psychiatrist has decided to hospitalize, the
expert testifies on behalf of a fellow doctor, an individual with whom the
testifying expert no doubt has significant professional, if not also personal,
contact. In either case, a substantial potential for bias exists.136 However,
the testifying psychiatrist also assumes the role of an “expert,” a witness
with specialized knowledge, upon whom the court must rely for an informed decision.137 As detailed below, this anomaly results in courts
inappropriately deferring to psychiatric “expertise.”
Notwithstanding the tightening of psychiatric standards, judges
typically defer to psychiatric judgments that a committed person meets the

133. PERLIN, supra note 94, at 90.
134. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1958).
135. See Robert S. Berger, The Psychiatric Expert as a Due Process Decisionmaker, 33
BUFF. L. REV. 681, 702 (1985).
136. See Binder & McNeil, supra note 115, at 1197 (noting advocacy associated with a
treating role renders it difficult for clinicians to act impartially and objectively).
137. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 69-70 (6th ed. 2006).
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criteria for civil commitment.138 Clinicians’ opinions about mental illness
and danger are dispositive in commitment hearings regardless of the particular commitment standard used; studies indicate the concordance rate, i.e.,
the rate of correlation between clinicians’ opinions and factfinders’ opinions, range between ninety and one hundred percent.139 Approximately
thirty years ago, one authority described civil commitment proceedings as
ceremonial in nature, in which courts “rubber stamp” expert conclusions.140
However, the perfunctory nature of civil commitment proceedings remains
today, more than twenty-five years after the Supreme Court decided
O’Connor v. Donaldson, and three-judge courts imposed supposedly stringent procedural safeguards.141 When judges defer to psychiatrists at a rate
between ninety and one hundred percent of the time the psychiatrist experts
actually become the decision-makers in the civil commitment process.
Numerous reasons exist for this excessive deference by judges. First,
most jurisdictions give judges little or no training in mental health law or
the finer points of psychiatric diagnosis and treatment.142 Accordingly,
138. See Grant H. Morris, “Let’s Do the Time Warp Again”: Assessing the Competence of
Counsel in Mental Health Conservatorship Proceedings, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 283, 314-15
(2009); Bagby, supra note 17, at 385 (“[Li]ngering deference to psychiatric recommendation,
commitment without evidence of facts of dangerousness.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also
David L. Bazelon, The Dilemma of Criminal Responsibility, 72 KY. L.J. 263, 267 (1983-84)
(asserting judges prefer to delegate difficult decision-making to psychiatric experts).
139. MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 349. In reaching this conclusion, the authors relied in
part on a study in Iowa that found civil commitment hearings served as little more than a rubber
stamp of physicians’ opinions. Id. at 319; see also Harold J. Bursztajn, Robert M. Hamm &
Thomsas G. Gutheil, Beyond the Black Letter of the Law: An Empirical Study of an Individual
Judge’s Decision Process for Civil Commitment Hearings, 25 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L.
7982, 7982-83 (1997) (noting in Massachusetts, a court ordered committed every patient who
psychiatrists petitioned for commitment; a second study in Colorado found judges committed
twenty-four of twenty-seven patients whom psychiatrists petitioned for commitment); Morris,
supra note 138, at 329-30, 332 (2009) (stating courts granted applications for conservatorships,
proceedings tantamount to civil commitment in California, in 97.9% of cases; in each case,
counsel introduced psychiatric testimony); William Hoffman Pincus, Note, Civil Commitment and
the “Great Confinement” Revisited: Straightjacketing Individual Rights, Stifling Culture, 36 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1769, 1806-08 (1995) (discussing an empirical evaluation that found an almost
ninety percent correlation rate between psychiatric testimony and judicial dispositions); Winick,
supra note 3, at 41-42 (stating the concordance rate most frequently exceeds ninety-five percent).
The rate of correlation detailed by the authors in the 1990s hardly differed for the rate of correlation found in the 1960s and 1970s. See Virginia A. Hiday, Application of the Dangerousness
Standard in Civil Commitment, 5 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 275, 277 (1981) (noting numerous studies
detail how courts deferred to psychiatrists for judgments of dangerousness and, hence, abrogate
their decision-making responsibility); Norman G. Poythress, Jr., Mental Health Expert Testimony:
Current Problems, 5 J. PSYCHIATRY & L., 201, 213 (1977) (stating in six studies of civil
commitment hearings between 1964 and 1972, the correlation between expert testimony and
judges’ decisions ranged from ninety-six to one hundred percent). In the hearings from which the
author gathered information, the concordance rate from all localities was 86.3%. This ranged
from 66.6% in Queens County, New York, to 100 % in Dade County, Florida.
140. Poythress, supra note 139, at 211.
141. See Eastman, supra note 44, at 322.
142. Appelbaum, supra note 78, at 66.
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judges defer to psychiatric opinion because they feel they lack the requisite
expertise to independently assess whether patients meet the statutory
criteria for commitment. 143 Furthermore, judges do not want to stand in the
way of clinicians providing treatment to those deemed in need of care.144
Hence, judges lack interest in scrutinizing the substance of expert testimony
when scrutiny compels a finding that a patient does not meet the civil
commitment standards.145 In this way, a desire to not interfere with needed
care often results in a lack of interest in applying governing legal
standards.146
Finally, a paternalistic, non-adversarial approach to the civil commitment process constitutes the safest course of action for judges. Just as the
release of a patient who causes harm can produce horrible consequences for
the doctor who released the patient, a judge who releases a patient who
harms another person after release will likely suffer the same fate.147
However, the acceptance of psychiatric testimony at face value at the
expense of an honest application commitment standards amounts to judges
acting as enforcers of a societal morality that believes it is better to both err
on the side of caution and provide treatment to those who are deemed to
need it than it is to carefully apply governing law that impacts on fundamental rights.148 For these judges, reliance upon expert testimony provides
a basis for a decision that can often withstand appellate scrutiny. The
affirmance of a trial court’s decision relying on unsubstantiated expert testimony is most likely to occur when little factual basis exists to disprove the
unsubstantiated opinion. When commitment hearings lack vigorous advocacy on behalf of the patient, chances increase that an appellate court will
not have a detailed factual record that will either substantiate or disprove an

143. Hiday, supra note 5, at 665.
144. MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 348-49 (stating when attorneys acted in adversarial
fashion, judges made clear such advocacy did not impact their decision-making process if the
goals of legal advocacy conflicted with the opinions of the medical experts); see also Hiday, supra
note 139, at 288 (arguing courts exhibit an impulse to move beyond rigid, formal legal process
and consider the whole person); Hiday, supra note 5, at 651.
145. See Richard Rogers, The Uncritical Acceptance of Risk Assessment in Forensic
Practice, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 595, 602 (2000) (discussing a number of authorities have
convincingly demonstrated triers of fact do not accurately utilize probabilistic estimates, even
when the estimates are carefully explained).
146. MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 348; see also Michael J. Saks, Expert Witnesses,
Nonexpert Witnesses, and Nonwitness Experts, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291, 293 (1990)
(detailing the acknowledgement of a judge to law students that he authorized the commitment of
individuals who did not meet commitment criteria because of a desire to facilitate needed
treatment).
147. MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 349.
148. See Arrigo & Williams, supra note 75, at 184-87.
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opinion rendered by a psychiatric expert. As detailed below, vigorous efforts at representation often do not exist.
B. OTHER FAILURES OF THE SUPPOSED ADVERSARY SYSTEM
While many federal and state courts imposed numerous, supposedly
stringent, substantive and procedural protections in the 1970s and 80s,149
the failure of a narrowing of commitment statutes to result in a decrease in
the number of commitments suggests tighter standards and procedures have
not been applied in practice.150 Court hearings were supposed to serve as a
check on psychiatric decision-making; all too often they have not.151
Responsibility for this failure lies, to a significant degree, with attorneys
who represent patients in commitment proceedings but who have shirked
their responsibility to act as effective advocates for their clients.152 Instead
of rigorous advocacy by attorneys, norms of cooperation and accommodation typically govern the civil commitment process.153 Notwithstanding the
tightening of psychiatric standards, attorneys who represent civil committees often act in a passive, nonadversarial, or perfunctory manner.154 Some
attorneys come unprepared to represent their client,155 accept at face value
the conclusions of psychiatric experts without even the slightest degree of
skepticism,156 and otherwise fail to effectively participate in the hearing.157
The lack of an adversarial role of civil committees’ attorneys and the
concomitant informal nature of commitment proceedings can be evinced in
a comparison between how attorneys present and challenge evidence of
149. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
150. MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 348.
151. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 138, at 329-41; Turkheimer & Parry, supra note 53, at 64648.
152. See Michael L. Perlin, “I Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your Funeral, My
Trial”: Global Clinical Legal Education and the Right to Counsel in Civil Commitment Cases, 28
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 241, 241 (2008) (“If there has been any constant in modern mental
disability law in its thirty-five year history, it is the near universal reality that counsel assigned to
represent individuals at involuntary civil commitment cases is likely to be ineffective.”); Winick,
supra note 3, at 41 (recognizing the failure of attorneys to fulfill their adversarial role has turned
commitment hearings “into a farce and a mockery in which . . . judges appear to ‘rubber stamp’
the recommendations of clinical expert witnesses”); see generally Michael L. Perlin, Fatal
Assumption: A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 39, 39 (1992).
153. Arrigo, supra note 44, at 144.
154. Appelbaum, supra note 78, at 66; Bagby, supra note 17, at 385 (internal quotations
omitted).
155. See McGraw et al., supra note 89, at 285; see also Poythress, supra note 139, at 210-11.
156. See Hiday, supra note 139, at 287 (noting in one study, seldom did the patient’s counsel
challenge the psychiatrist’s assertions of dangerousness set forth in doctors’ affidavits, even
though in ten percent of cases, the affidavits did not contain the legally required facts detailing
imminent danger).
157. See Morris, supra note 138, at 330-32.
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dangerousness in commitment proceedings involving sexual offenders and
commitment proceedings of individuals who suffer from mental illness.
Extensive case law exists that has arisen out of attempts to offer actuarial or
other empirically-based evidence of danger in sexual offender proceedings.158 The testimony results in clinicians offering opinion on the specific
probability of a committee engaging in future acts of sexual violence.159 It
may well be that attorneys representing the state rely on actuarial evidence
because mental health professionals recognize that clinical judgment alone
results in assessments of danger with questionable validity while the
clinically adjusted actuarial method has been considered the most accurate
method of assessing risk.160 The adversarial nature of the proceedings
require attorneys to put forth evidence that has the best chance of withstanding vigorous cross-examination.
In the civil commitment context, instances of vigorous cross-examination often generate hostility from both judges and psychiatric witnesses.161
Judges often discourage zealous advocacy and make clear vigorous representation does not impact the decision-making process when the position
put forth by counsel controverts the opinions put forth by psychiatric
experts.162 As a result, attorneys will limit their advocacy efforts to what
they believe judges will tolerate.163 That psychiatrists do not generally
complain about intensive cross-examination in other legal contexts164 may
well mean the general lack of adversarialness in the civil commitment
context has created an expectation that patients’ lawyers should play only a
perfunctory role in the commitment process. Perhaps that is why patients’
attorneys rarely call more than two witnesses and frequently call none.165
When attorneys fail to present a fully competent case, those judges who
158. See, e.g., In re Holtz, 653 N.W.2d 613, 616 (Iowa Ct. App. 2002); People v. Taylor, 782
N.E.2d 920, 923-24 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002); In re Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d 72, 77-80 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); In re Dean, No. 17320-8-III, 2000 WL 690142, at *2 (Wash. App.
May 30, 2000).
159. See, e.g., Dean, No. 17320-8-III, 2000 WL 690142, at *2.
160. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
161. Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra note 152, at 52.
162. See Appelbaum, supra note 78, at 66; MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 349; see also
Winick, supra note 3, at 42; Perlin, supra note 152, at 44 n.33 (stating judges, often in anger,
rebuff vigorous cross-examinations).
163. Frueh, supra note 114, at 306-07.
164. Perlin, Fatal Assumption, supra note 152, at 52.
165. MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 348; see also Morris, supra note 138, at 330-31 (in
forty-three of forty-seven hearings, the commitment subject served as the only witness for his
side; in only one case did the attorney for the commitment subject present a witness other than the
commitment subject). In the seventy-six hearings about which the author gathered data, the
patient’s lawyer failed to call any witnesses fourteen times, called one witness forty-seven times,
two witnesses twelve times, and three witnesses three times. Of the forty-seven times in which a
lawyer called one witness only, the patient was the only witness called forty-one times.
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carefully attempt to apply legal criteria lack the ability to adequately assess
the merits of the hospital’s position seeking confinement.166 Judges tend to
lack knowledge of the weak basis for psychiatric testimony.167 Hence, the
failure of lawyers to vigorously represent their clients in civil commitment
proceedings results in even well-intentioned judges failing to learn about
the weaknesses of psychiatric testimony.168 Moreover, while judges give
great deference to psychiatric opinions,169 and psychiatrists appearing in
court invariably testify on behalf of the committing hospital,170 attorneys
infrequently seek independent psychiatric testimony.171
In addition, many commitment hearings have evolved into proceedings
that are not accusatorial in nature, but rather inquisitorial.172 The committing hospital will occasionally call the patient as a witness in hopes that
the patient will “hang himself.” This is done when a hospital fails to present a strong case in support of hospitalization.173
The failure of the hospital to put on a persuasive case can occur when
the patient’s treating physician is a foreign-born doctor who lacks fluency
in English. Some facilities have found a solution to this problem through
the use of a professional witness, i.e., a physician who testifies regularly for
the hospital while not necessarily serving as a certified or treating doctor for
any particular patient. This type of witness usually makes a much better
witness than the typical doctor. This witness is more familiar with civil
commitment law and knows how to present psychiatric testimony in a manner that is useful for the court.174 This witness quickly learns what evidence
166. See Appelbaum, supra note 78, at 67.
167. Hiday, supra note 5, at 655.
168. Id. Vigorous advocacy should result in attempts to educate the court about weaknesses
in psychiatric assessments of dangerousness through cross-examination. However, when psychiatrists are so lacking in professional expertise they are ignorant of the well-documented weaknesses
in expert testimony, then the lawyer loses the ability to effectively educate the court through
cross-examination. When this occurs, the lawyer must rely on a court-appointed expert to elicit
testimony about the weaknesses in expert testimony.
169. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
170. See McGraw et al., supra note 89, at 289.
171. MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 349 (citing Serena D. Stier & Kurt J. Stoebe,
Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Iowa: The Failure of the 1975 Legislation, 64
IOWA L. REV. 1284 (1979) (discussing how one study in Iowa found that patients’ attorneys failed
to request the appointment of an independent expert in more than ninety-nine percent of cases));
see also Morris, supra note 138, at 330-31 (noting that in none of forty-seven contested cases did
the attorney for the commitment subject seek an appointment of a psychiatrist). Two reasons exist
for this failure. First, lawyers fear the court-appointed expert will render the same opinions as the
expert testifying for the hospital. McGraw et al., supra note 89, at 278. Second, any appointment
of an independent psychiatrist will delay the proceeding, which serves as a major disincentive to
seek the appointment of an expert. Van Duizend & Zimmerman, supra note 89, at 246.
172. MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 349.
173. Van Duizend & Zimmerman, supra note 89, at 261.
174. Id. at 258.
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judges find persuasive;175 he can turn the psychiatric evaluation into a
quasi-interrogation, enabling him to gather evidence that buttresses the
hospital’s position that the patient is mentally ill and dangerous. The nontreating psychiatrist can help eliminate problems that might plague the
hospital’s case, due to lack of preparation, by asking the patient information
contained in the hospital record or provided by individuals familiar with the
patient. Particularly because patients cannot refuse to answer questions,176
the non-treating psychiatrist can use statements made by the patient as
admissions.
In sum, one author of an empirical study concluded data on the civil
commitment process in California confirms what the Montana Supreme
Court held: the civil commitment process “is an ‘obvious systematic
failure’ ‘that routinely accepts—and even requires—an unreasonably low
standard of legal assistance and generally disdains zealous, adversarial
confrontation.’”177 The combination of the abdication of one’s adversary
role by attorneys, the substantial deference paid by courts to psychiatrists,
and the use of hearsay in lieu of testimony subject to cross-examination
creates the potential for the deprivation of liberty based on hearings that last
very brief periods of time.178
175. See Hiday & Smith, supra note 53, at 441-42 (examining dangerous behavior).
176. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986), courts
were split as to whether civil committees could assert the privilege against self-incrimination to
refuse to answer questions posed to them by psychiatrists. Compare Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411
F. Supp. 1113, 1130-32 (D. Haw. 1976) (holding the privilege against self-incrimination attaches
in civil commitment proceedings); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 394 (D. Ala. 1974);
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1101 (D. Wis. 1972); with French v. Blackburn, 428 F.
Supp. 1351, 1358-59 (D.N.C. 1977), aff’d, 443 U.S. 901 (1977) (holding the privilege against selfincrimination does not attach in civil commitment proceedings); State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro,
202 S.E.2d 109, 126 (W. Va. 1974). In Allen, the Supreme Court held a committee subject to
confinement pursuant to a sexual delinquency proceeding deemed civil in nature could not assert
the privilege. Allen, 478 U.S. at 375. Since Allen, there have been very few cases in which a civil
committee asserted the privilege against self-incrimination; in the few cases that have addressed
the issue, courts have held the privilege does not attach to civil commitment proceedings. See
Goetz v. Crosson, 728 F. Supp. 995, 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Ughetto v. Acrish, 518 N.Y.S.2d 398,
403 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). Ironically, in Ughetto, the court held the privilege against selfincrimination did not attach to examinations conducted by a non-treating psychiatrist on the
ground that the purpose of a civil commitment was not the marshalling of evidence but a
determination of the clinical needs of the patient. Ughetto, 518 N.Y.S.2d at 403. This rationale
was clearly wrong because when a non-treating psychiatrist examines a patient, he or she does so
for the express purpose of gathering evidence to support the hospital’s position.
177. Morris, supra note 138, at 340-41 (quoting In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485,
494, 492 (Mont. 2001)).
178. Eastman, supra note 44, at 325; Morris, supra note 138, at 330 (noting hearings average
approximately twenty-three minutes); Michael Perlin, “Their Promises of Paradise”: Will
Olmstead v. L.C. Resuscitate the Constitutional “Least Restrictive Alternative” Principle in
Mental Disability Law, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 999, 1021 (2000). The average time of the seventyeight hearings about which the author gathered data was forty-one minutes. However, if one
excludes eight hearings conducted in Cook and Kane counties in Illinois, the average time was
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Accordingly, while physicians will certify patients who do not meet the
civil commitment criteria,179 the failings of the commitment system have
resulted in hospitals continuing to confine individuals who fail to satisfy the
commitment standard.180 Like nearly blind deference to psychiatric testimony by judges, informal, non-adversarial commitment proceedings also
serve to further an unstated goal of providing treatment to those who
require treatment regardless of whether they pose a danger to themselves or
others.181 The failure of the civil commitment hearing to fulfill its raison d’
etre, namely limiting commitments to those who satisfy the commitment
criteria, emboldens clinicians who wish to confine individuals—whom they
deem require treatment but who fail to satisfy the commitment criteria—to
seek the commitment of such individuals.182 Coupled with the excessive
deference judges give to psychiatric testimony, the failures many authorities
have found inherent in the civil commitment system have meant stricter
commitment standards have not resulted in a concomitant protection of
liberties for subjects of civil commitment.
V. COMPOUNDING THE PROBLEM—THE ARBITRARY AND
EXCESSIVELY VAGUE CONCEPT OF DANGER
What has also contributed to the ability of psychiatrists to unduly
influence the legal process is the exceedingly ambiguous concept of
danger.183 By definition, any standard imposed by the Supreme Court to
satisfy due process cannot violate the Constitution. However, as the school
desegregation cases have taught, broad constitutional standards, such as “all
deliberate speed,”184 require further interpretation and clarification if the
class of individuals who have been subject to unconstitutional actions are
going to benefit from a seminal Supreme Court decision that changes the
legal landscape. In the civil commitment context, the seminal Supreme
Court case was O’Connor v. Donaldson, which held a state cannot confine
a mentally ill person who is capable of surviving safely in the commuthirty-four minutes. In Cook and Kane counties, the eight hearings observed averaged one hour
and forty-nine minutes in length.
179. See supra notes 57-134 and accompanying text.
180. See, e.g., Appelbaum, supra note 78, at 67.
181. In re R.O. serves as an example of a court subverting basic due process principles to the
goal of providing treatment deemed necessary. See generally In re R.O., 2002 ND 154, 652
N.W.2d 327. In that case, the court required a mentally ill individual to proceed with his
commitment hearing—when the court-appointed counsel only one day earlier—on the ground that
a continuance was not in the committee’s best clinical interests. Id. at 327.
182. See Appelbaum, supra note 78, at 67.
183. See, e.g., Arrigo & Williams, supra note 75, at 187 (detailing descriptions of the
dangerousness requirement as “woefully lacking” and “malleable and clouded by incoherence”).
184. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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nity.185 This is particularly true when, as in both the school desegregation
and civil commitment contexts, those charged with enforcing or applying
the new protective standard oppose the new standard and utilize what
amounts to unforeseen vagueness to frustrate its implementation.186
Well-settled Supreme Court doctrine requires individuals who enforce
government law may not act on an ad hoc or subjective basis.187 Hence,
due process requires the existence of “reasonably explicit standards for
those who are to enforce the rules and regulations.”188 Similarly, the
Supreme Court has strongly suggested due process is violated when a law
provides state officials “absolute discretion” to determine what conduct
falls within the statute.189
Challenges to the use of undue discretion in the enforcement of a government law have generally been based on void for vagueness grounds.190
The lack of a generally accepted legal or psychiatric meaning of “dangerousness” in many jurisdictions, and the failure of psychiatrists to receive
training to evaluate dangerousness, have resulted in mental health experts
providing their own personal and subjective definition of the term.191 As
detailed below, without clarifying or otherwise narrowing the concept of
dangerousness, the commitment of mentally ill individuals, because physicians have deemed them “dangerous,” can result in the type of arbitrary
enforcement the void for vagueness doctrine prohibits. Under this doctrine,
a legal standard is impermissibly vague and, hence, violates due process,
when it results in “those who are responsible for its administration . . .
‘differ[ing] as to its application.’”192
First, it is not entirely clear what the concept of “dangerousness”
encompasses. At the very least, any contention that a person is dangerous
encompasses numerous assertions. A psychiatrist who certifies an individual as dangerous concludes the person has certain characteristics that are
associated with a certain probability of harmful behavior. The probability
of harmful behavior is sufficiently great as to justify preventive intervention.193 In addition to assessing the likelihood of harm, the factfinder may
185. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 105, at 66 (stating the absence of a requirement to specify
gravity of harm has resulted in an arbitrary application of commitment laws).
187. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
188. Bass Plating Co. v. Town of Windsor, 639 F. Supp. 873, 880 (D. Conn. 1986).
189. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 61 (1999).
190. See, e.g., id. at 46-52.
191. Steadman, supra note 37, at 267.
192. In re Commitment of N.N., 679 A.2d 1174, 1181 (N.J. 1996) (quoting Coates v.
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)).
193. Monahan & Wexler, supra note 36, at 38.
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also examine the magnitude and imminence of any harm that may occur.194
Finally, in the absence of qualifying language, an evaluator must determine
the nature of harm that is at risk of occurring. Is it physical harm to oneself
or another person?195 Does the concept of harm also include emotional
harm, as one court concluded?196 Is someone subject to commitment if he
or she poses a threat of harm to property but not another person?197
While a few courts have addressed the issue of whether a finding of
dangerousness encompasses the likelihood of imminent harm and the magnitude of harm that may occur,198 courts in most jurisdictions have not
addressed these considerations and, hence, have failed to establish a framework for physicians to apply.199 Moreover, in the absence of statutory
language or a judicial opinion clarifying the meaning of “danger,” a
clinician can interpret any threat to cause harm as creating a danger,
regardless of the remoteness of the threat.200 Likewise, when the perceived
194. See Joel A. Dvoskin & Kirk Heilbrun, Risk Assessment and Release Decision-Making:
Toward Resolving the Great Debate, 29 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 6, 9 (2001) (detailing
how a clinician or factfinder can assess magnitude, probability, and imminence); McNeil &
Binder, supra note 41, at 1321 (stating even commitment statutes with specific probability estimates are often vague about the time frame of risk and setting in which harm may occur).
195. See Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 451 (D. Iowa 1976); Doremus v. Farrell,
407 F. Supp. 509, 514-15 (D. Neb. 1975); In re Harry M., 468 N.Y.S.2d 359, 364 (N.Y. App. Div.
1983).
196. See Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 392 (D. Ala. 1974).
197. See Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173, 176 (9th Cir. 1980) (examining the constitutionality
of a commitment statute that authorized confinement based on a threat of harm to property); State
v. Krol, 344 A.2d 289, 301 (N.J. 1975) (holding “danger” includes a risk of substantial destruction
of property).
198. See Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1969); In re Torksi C., 918 N.E.2d
1218, 1230 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); Hatcher v. Wachtel, 269 S.E.2d 849, 852 (W. Va. 1980); Krol,
344 A.2d at 302.
199. See PERLIN, supra note 54, § 2A-4.1. A concept of danger that requires a factfinder to
take into account the probability, magnitude, and imminence of any harm helps to reconcile these
competing interests of the state in protecting against harm and individual interest in liberty. It also
creates a less arbitrary concept of danger by structuring an assessment process where the greater
the magnitude, the less certainty of harm should be needed. See Commonwealth v. Nasasr, 406
N.E.2d 1286, 1291 (Mass. 1980). For example, a vast difference exists between someone who has
access to guns and manifests homicidal ideation toward a specific potential victim and someone
who lacks impulse control but has no history of violent behavior and does not manifest homicidal
ideation. Certainly with the former commitment subject, a factfinder should not have to reach the
same conclusion about the level of certainty and imminence as would the factfinder assessing the
latter commitment subject.
200. Sherry Colb, Insane Fear: The Discriminatory Category of “Mentally Ill and
Dangerous”, 25 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 341, 348 (1999). Two states have
recently removed an imminence requirement from their commitment statutes. Monahan, supra
note 47, at 401. An absence of an imminence requirement is particularly significant because in
the civil commitment context, psychiatrists base most commitments on an assessment that a
patient is dangerous because of an inability to meet his or her basic needs. See supra note 53 and
accompanying text. Even if patients have been meeting their basic needs, if a psychiatrist opines a
patient’s symptoms render the patient at risk of suffering harm in the future, the absence of
empirical data on the issue of one’s inability to meet needs makes cross examination difficult.
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danger amounts to a threat of harm to property, one must ask whether the
potential harmful acts consist of property destruction that also places individuals at risk of harm or that simply place one at risk of losing money.201
Hence, little question exists that the dangerousness criteria is sufficiently
flexible or vague to allow considerable discretion in determining whether
an individual satisfies the criteria.202
A determination of an individual’s dangerousness differs from most
fact-finding determinations. It is a forward-looking determination where a
physician, at the very least, evaluates the likelihood of an allegedly mentally ill person causing harm to either self or others.203 This differs from the
traditional fact-finding in which the trier of fact must evaluate whether a set
of facts occurred previously and apply this set of facts to a particular legal
standard. Put another way, in criminal and in most civil contexts, the
ultimate issue involves an application of past fact to law; in the civil commitment context, the trier of fact must apply facts to assess the likelihood of
an event occurring in the future.204
Because one purpose of a civil commitment hearing is to assess the
likelihood of a particular event occurring, rather than determining whether
specific conduct has occurred, in the absence of definitive guidelines that
incorporate all facets of a dangerousness determination, the trier of fact has
Coupled with the deference given to psychiatric opinions, see supra notes 138-48 and accompanying text, the absence of an imminence requirement makes it much easier for clinicians to
justify an assessment of self-danger that may have little basis in fact. See, e.g., Robert Simon, The
Myth of “Imminent” Violence In Psychiatry and the Law, 75 U. CINN. L. REV. 631, 636 (2006)
(recognizing a requirement of likely harm in the foreseeable future can range from ten minutes to
ten years).
In In re Commitment in Dennis H., 647 N.W.2d 851 (Wis. 2002), the court found a commitment statute was not unconstitutionally vague when it required, inter alia, a substantial probability
that, if left untreated, the individual would suffer severe mental, emotional, or physical harm that
would result in loss of ability to function independently in the community. However, the court
never addressed whether the clause “function independently in the community” resulted in undue
discretion in its application. For example, does the ability to sustain oneself by living in a
homeless shelter constitute an ability to function independently in the community?
201. See In re H.G., 632 N.W.2d 458, 462-63 (N.D. 2001) (holding an insignificant financial
injury resulting from poor business judgment was insufficient to satisfy the danger requirement).
202. Bagby et al., supra note 109, at 32; see also Steven Datlof, The Law of Civil Commitment in Pennsylvania: Toward a Consistent Interpretation of the Mental Health Procedures Act,
38 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 3, 18 (1999); Christyne Ferris, Note, The Search for Due Process in Civil
Commitment Hearings: How Procedural Realities Have Altered Substantive Standards, 61
VAND. L. REV. 959, 973 (2008) (stating without limiting criteria, the broad scope of the
dangerousness standard renders it meaningless); Janus & Prentky, supra note 57, at 1449. For a
comprehensive survey of the language of civil commitment statutes detailing the disparity in
specificity in commitment statutes, see Steven Erickson et al., Beyond Overt Violence:
Wisconsin’s Progressive Civil Commitment Statute as a Marker of a New Era in Mental Health
Law, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 359, 388 (2005).
203. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
204. See David Simpson, Jr., Note, Involuntary Civil Commitment: The Dangerousness
Standard and Its Problems, 63 N.C. L. REV. 241, 255 (1984).
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far greater discretion to rule in a manner consistent with his or her value
system, as opposed to applying fact and law in a neutral manner.205 As one
New York Judge candidly recognized when pleading with the appellate
courts or legislature to clarify the meaning of posing a substantial “threat of
harm,” decisions to commit or release “were inevitably based upon my
personal values and standards.”206
Jurek v. Texas207 does not compel a different result. In Jurek, the
Supreme Court rejected a vagueness challenge to a death penalty statute
that required a determination there was a probability the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society.208 However, no reasonable juror could believe the issue of
imminence was a consideration in this determination: having concluded a
defendant committed murder, the statute required a determination that the
209
defendant would engage in violent, criminal conduct at any future time.
Likewise, because the statute required an assessment of a probability of
violent, criminal conduct, no issue of magnitude existed for the jury.
A review of the few vagueness challenges to dangerousness requirements in state civil commitment statutes reveals that whether an application
of the dangerousness requirement violates due process may depend on
whether, to what degree, and how a state legislature has defined danger.210
An Illinois appellate court held the definition of “dangerous conduct” in the
state’s commitment law is impermissibly vague and violates due process,
even though the statute defined “dangerous conduct” as “threatening
behavior or conduct that places another individual in reasonable expectation
of being harmed, or a person’s inability to provide, without the assistance of
family or outside help, for his or her basic physical needs so as to guard
himself or herself from serious harm.”211 On the other hand, another court
205. Cf. William J. Brennan, Jr., Reason, Passion and “The Progress of Law,” 10 CARDOZO
L. REV. 3, 4-5 (1988); Paul Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222, 226-27
(1984).
206. Judge Sees Lack of Guidelines For Committing Mental Patients, N.Y. L.J., November
27, 1987, at 1. Indeed, there is little question that any assessment of dangerousness contains a
normative component through which a clinician reaches a conclusion that the level of risk posed is
sufficiently great as to warrant the deprivation of liberty that civil commitment entails. See
Nicholas Scurich & Richard John, The Normative Threshold for Psychiatric Civil Commitment, 50
JURIMETRICS J. 425, 427 (2010).
207. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
208. Jurek, 428 U.S. at 267-68, 275-76.
209. See id. at 269.
210. See Simon v. Cook, 261 Fed. Appx. 873, 883 (6th Cir. 2008) (determining a statute that
authorized police to detain a dangerous individual was not impermissibly vague because the
statute defined dangerous as a “substantial physical harm or threat of substantial physical harm
upon self, family or others”).
211. In re Torksi C., 918 N.E.2d 1218, 1230 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). The court reasoned the
statute was impermissibly vague because it arguably authorized confinement in circumstances
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has strongly suggested a statute authorizing confinement when an individual poses a “substantial risk of physical harm” satisfies due process, while
a statute authorizing confinement when an individual “constitutes a danger”
does not.212 Likewise, “danger of physical harm” does not provide sufficient guidance to satisfy due process.213 To summarize, whether individuals transported to a hospital’s psychiatric emergency room for evaluation
suffer a deprivation of liberty often depends on the comparative weight the
particular examining physician gives to the competing interests of liberty
and the need for treatment.214 Until appellate courts impose limiting criteria
where the state does not have a legitimate interest in confining someone, such as when a person
places another at risk of suffering emotional harm as a result of being subject to racial slurs. Id. at
1231.
212. See Recovery Northwest v. Thorslund, 851 P.2d 1259, 1260 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
213. See Mays v. State of Washington, 68 P.3d 1114, 1121 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003).
214. Admittedly, a number of other courts have rejected void for vagueness challenges to
state civil commitment statutes. See generally In re LaBelle, 728 P.2d 138 (Wash. 1986); In re
Maricopa County, 840 P.2d 1042 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). However, in neither case did the courts
examine the risk of arbitrary enforcement created by a standard that permits, but does not require,
utilization of the concepts of imminence and magnitude and gives physicians the opportunity to
weigh the probability of harm against the need for treatment. Indeed, the court in LaBelle recognized utilization of the civil commitment process presented a danger of impermissibly imposing
majoritarian values on a person’s chosen lifestyle. LaBelle, 728 P.2d at 144. However, the
LaBelle court held this danger was remedied by the requirement of recent, tangible evidence of a
person’s inability to meet one’s basic needs that presented “a high probability of serious physical
harm within the near future.” Id. Not only are judges generally more informed about any
narrowing of legal criteria than are physicians, but, notwithstanding the performance of many
lawyers in the civil commitment process, see supra notes 152-57 and accompanying text, one
would expect lawyers to educate those judges who are ignorant of the governing legal criteria. In
the absence of good legal training and some sort of directive that physicians not only apply the
commitment statute on its face but adhere to narrowing constructions by courts, physicians are left
with a broad range of discretion when examining individuals in the psychiatric emergency room.
Indeed, the court in Maricopa County upheld the commitment standard because “[t]he difficulty in
expressing concepts [that would narrow and/or clarify governing substantive criteria] is particularly evident in mental health statutes.” Maricopa County, 840 P.2d at 1050. The difficulty in
articulating relevant mental health concepts does not justify permitting continued application of
the statute. Rather, administrative directives must direct physicians to apply the standard in a
uniform manner. Finally, the court in In re Commitment of Curiel, upheld a statute that authorized
commitment if the court found it was “substantially probable” the committee would commit
sexual violence. See generally In re Commitment of Curiel, 597 N.W.2d 697 (Wis. 1999). The
Curiel court found its interpretation of the term “substantially probable” to mean “much more
likely than not” meant individuals of common intelligence would not differ as to its applicability.
Id. at 708-09.
In re Vanderblomen, while resolving a vagueness challenge to the constitutionality of a
commitment statute, does not provide authority on this issue. See generally In re Vanderblomen,
956 P.2d 1320 (Kan. 1998). The patient in Vanderblomen asserted the statutory definition of
mental illness violated the void for vagueness doctrine because mental illness required reference
to the DSM-IV, a diagnostic guide published by the APA that modified the categories of mental
disorders defined as mental illnesses. Id. at 1323. The challenge to the statute in question did not
involve an assertion that the absence of any reference to the concepts of magnitude and imminence in connection to an assessment of dangerousness rendered the statute vague. But see Glatz
v. Kort, 807 F.2d 1514, 1521 (10th Cir. 1986) (upholding the constitutionality of a law authorizing
the release of an insanity acquitee only when the individual has no mental condition that would
likely cause harm to be a danger to self or others); United States v. Schell, 692 F.2d 672, 675
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on this standard, certifying physicians retain the ability to fit their legal
findings to their desired clinical objectives.
VI. CORRECTING THE PROBLEMS: STEPS TO LIMIT THE
INAPPROPRIATE INFLUENCE OF PSYCHIATRISTS
A. UTILIZE STRUCTURED CLINICAL EVALUATIONS TO LIMIT THE
EXERCISE OF UNSTRUCTURED CLINICAL DISCRETION AT THE
CERTIFICATION STAGE
To rectify the problems related to the exercise of unstructured clinical
judgment when assessing risk, psychiatrists should base their opinions on
empirically-based data.215 For instance, they can rely on the use of the
clinically adjusted actuarial method, which has been considered the most
accurate method of assessing risk.216 Literature suggests a number of ways
to improve dangerousness assessments of patients facing civil commitment.217 The clinically adjusted actuarial method involves the use of a
statistically based formula with the clinician making adjustments based on
the particular clinical aspects of the case.218 Alternatively, the guided
clinical approach requires a clinician to identify and incorporate into the
evaluation process specific risk factors, but permits the clinician to weigh
the factors in any manner he or she deems appropriate.219 It may well be
the clinically adjusted actuarial method and guided clinical approach
improve the accuracy of the assessment process because they limit clinical
(10th Cir. 1982) (upholding a federal law requiring the imposition of increased punishment for
dangerous special offenders). However, at least Schell appears to be distinguishable. In Schell,
the court was making a determination of future harm only after a conviction. Schell, 692 F.2d at
675. A diminished liberty interest in this instance may well provide the government with greater
latitude in taking steps to further its police power. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 789
n.12 (1973) (holding a person who possesses an absolute liberty interest and faces a loss of liberty
is differently situated from an already-convicted defendant and entitled to a higher degree of
protection).
215. See, e.g., Borum, supra note 46, at 953 (stating structured and standardized risk assessment processes will improve accuracy); Dvoskin & Heilbrun, supra note 194, at 9; Caroline Mee
& Harold Hall, Risky Business: Assessing Dangerousness in Hawaii, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 63, 90112 (2001) (detailing various empirically-based methods of assessing danger); Steadman, supra
note 37, at 269 (detailing the usefulness of two tools in assessing risk of harm: the HCR-20 and
the Violence Risk Assessment Guide).
216. In re Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d 72, 80 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). The
clinically-adjusted actuarial method involves the use of a statistically-based formula with the
clinician making adjustments based on the particular clinical aspects of the case. See id.
217. Admittedly, much of the literature addressing ways to improve the process of assessing
danger does not involve the assessment of the civil commitment population. However, because all
relevant literature involves the assessment of people with mental illness, one can expect that what
empirical research involving the mentally ill population as a whole has found will prove
instructive in the context of civil commitment.
218. See id.
219. See Scherr, supra note 42, at 21.
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discretion while enabling clinicians to take into account significant particular aspects of any case.220
Two risk assessment scholars, Dale McNeil and Renee Binder, have
aided clinicians who recognize the need to structure clinical judgment by
developing a concise actuarial screening tool to aid in assessment of a
patient’s potential for violence.221 The tool has correctly classified sixtyfive percent of individuals assessed and demonstrates the potential for
developing simple, easy-to-use actuarial type methods that enhance the
222
Other, perhaps less simplistic, actuarial
accuracy of risk assessments.
assessment tools that have been shown to enhance the accuracy of the
assessment process consist of the HCR-20223 and a classification tree that
directs psychiatrists to analyze specific empirically-based factors when
assessing risk.224
The use of some sort of checklist can help to eliminate a common
problem in dangerousness assessments, which can be considered one-way
evaluations of dangerousness: the examination of risk factors only. A risk
factor is a measurable characterization of each subject in a specified population that precedes the outcome of interest and that can be used to divide the
population into two groups: a high risk group, and a low risk group.225 An
evaluation of risk factors, but not protective factors, i.e., factors that lower
the risk of harm-causing behavior, is inherently inaccurate and constitutes
an implicitly biased evaluation.226

220. See Binder & McNeil, supra note 115, at 1192 (stating assessment tools enhance
evaluations by grounding assessments in variables associated with probability of harm); Litwack,
supra note 59, at 414 (noting the use of actuarial or structured assessment tools ensures clinicians
will consider certain relevant factors).
221. Dale McNiel & Renee Binder, Screening for Risk of Inpatient Violence, 18 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 579, 584-85 (1994). This consists of a screening checklist that contains five items:
physical attacks during the two-week period prior to admission; absence of suicidal behavior
(attempts, gestures, or threats) in the two-week period prior to admission; diagnosis of schizophrenia or mania; male gender; and the status of currently married or living together. See also Ole
Thienhaus & Melissa Piasecki, Assessment of Psychiatric Patients’ Risk of Violence Toward
Others, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1129, 1129-30 (1998) (recommending clinicians gather
concrete sets of information when assessing risk of violence).
222. McNeil & Binder, supra note 221, at 584.
223. See Litwack, supra note 59, at 431. The HCR-20 is a risk assessment guide that
requires a clinician to evaluate ten historical criteria, five clinical criteria, and five risk
management criteria. Id. at 430.
224. See John Monahan et al., Developing a Clinically Useful Actuarial Tool for Assessing
Violence Risk, 176 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 312, 318 (2000).
225. Helena Kraemer et al., Coming to Terms with the Terms of Risk, 54 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 337, 338 (1997).
226. See Rogers, supra note 145, at 598; see also Hanson, supra note 48, at 52-53
(discussing three plausible approaches to assessment of harm to others—guided clinical, pure
actuarial, and adjusted actuarial—all of which require reference to specifically delineated factors).
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No reason exists why similar clinicians cannot utilize similar checklists
when their initial clinical impressions suggest a patient may pose a danger
to himself by suicide or as a result of an inability to meet one’s basic needs.
Known risk factors related to suicide exist,227 which should facilitate the
utilization of a checklist related to suicide. In the absence of literature,
mental health professionals, hospital administrators, and patients’ lawyers
should attempt to collaborate on a checklist that will guide the evaluation
process when a clinician believes a patient may lack the ability to meet his
or her needs. The use of structured clinical decision-making can help eliminate pretextual assessments of danger. Structured risk assessments require
clinicians to apply an individual’s history, symptoms, and behavior to a predetermined empirically-based set of criteria. Accordingly, clinicians will
no longer be able to justify an assessment of danger on symptoms, behaviors, or history presented by a patient that best justify a determination
sought to be reached prior to the beginning of the examination.228
Today, it is not uncommon to see hospital records containing forms
with clearly delineated criteria that guide a clinical assessment of risk.
However, psychiatrists complete these forms after a patient has been certified for commitment. The failure to require psychiatrists to use these forms
at the certification stage facilitates the continued use of unstructured clinical
judgment. It also sends a message to physicians that a careful, structured
assessment of risk at the certification stage is not important; a careful
assessment of risk is important only after certification of the patient has
been completed. In other words, a careful assessment of risk is important
for risk management consideration but not because the consequences of the
assessment can significantly impact individual rights.
B. FOLLOWING CERTIFICATION, PROMPTLY PROVIDE COURTAPPOINTED EXPERT ASSISTANCE
When civil committees challenge their hospitalization, the committing
hospital will offer, as evidence, expert testimony of a psychiatrist.229 The
227. See, e.g., MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 355-57.
228. Cf. Monahan, supra note 63, at 503.
229. See, e.g., McGraw et al., supra note 89, at 289; Morris, supra note 138, at 331; Van
Duizend & Zimmerman, supra note 89, at 258. In all of the forty-six hearings in New York about
which the authored gathered data, the committing hospital presented expert psychiatric testimony.
Likewise, in fifteen of the sixteen hearings in Dade County, the hospital presented medical
testimony; the lone exception occurred when the hospital presented the patient’s guardian as its
lone witness. The pattern varied somewhat in Illinois. In Cook County, the committing hospital
proffered the testimony of a psychologist in four out of four cases. In Kane County, the hospital
presented a psychiatric expert in all four cases observed. In the four cases observed in Madison
County, the hospital presented a psychiatrist once, a psychologist once, and a social worker twice.
In the two cases that went to trial in Union County, the hospital presented a psychologist twice.
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ability of psychiatrists to conclude a patient is dangerous when they want to
provide treatment as a result of the amorphous nature of the concept of danger, and the significant reliance on this expert testimony by judges, places
civil committees at a distinct disadvantage. Only the ability of committees
to offer expert testimony of their own enables them to overcome this disadvantage; the failure to provide an opportunity to offer this evidence violates
due process.
The Supreme Court has recognized, for all intents and purposes, civil
commitment proceedings revolve around psychiatric and other expert
testimony:
There may be factual issues to resolve in a commitment proceeding, but the factual aspects represent only the beginning of the
inquiry. Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to
either himself or others and is in need of confined therapy turns on
the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists.230
That a committing hospital always employs psychiatrists in its attempt to
prove its case indicates the use of psychiatric experts is a “necessit[y], not
[a] luxur[y].”231 Indeed, one Supreme Court Justice has recognized because
commitment for compulsory psychiatric treatment involves medical issues,
“a person possessing . . . [psychiatric or other mental health] . . . qualifycations normally would be preferred” to the assistance of an attorney.232
Lower state courts that have examined the issue have also recognized
expert assistance may well be more important than the assistance of a
lawyer:
No matter how brilliant the lawyer may be, he is in no position to
effectively contest the commitment proceedings because he has no
way to rebut the testimony of the psychiatrist from the institution
who has already certified to the patient’s insanity . . . .

230. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
231. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
232. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 500 (Powell, J., concurring); see also United States v.
Johnson, 238 F.2d 565, 572 (1956) (Frank, J., dissenting) (“The best lawyer in the world cannot
competently defend an accused person if the lawyer cannot obtain existing evidence crucial to the
defense [such as an expert] . . . . In such circumstances, if the government does not supply the
funds, justice is denied the poor—and represents but an upper bracket privilege[.]”); Proctor v.
Harris, 413 F.2d 383, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“[I]f an indigent patient needs and is entitled to a
lawyer, far more may he also need the assistance of a psychiatrist in the preparation of his case.);
David Medine, The Constitutional Right to Expert Assistance for Indigents in Civil Cases, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 281, 329 (1990) (recognizing in a number of settings, an expert is more valuable to
a litigant than an attorney).
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This court has had enough experience to know that psychiatrists
differ very definitely in their evaluations and diagnoses of mental
illness. In a commitment proceeding where the court is in effect
bound by the expertise of the psychiatrist, the right to counsel is of
little value without a concurrent right to an independent
psychiatric examination.233
Another court noted:
“[T]he rights to counsel and to be heard in a civil commitment proceeding will often fail to adequately protect the respondent unless
he is able to secure the advice or testimony of his own examiner.
Otherwise, the respondent and his lawyer will have difficulty in
rebutting or exposing errors and other deficiencies in the testimony
of the expert state witnesses.”
. . . Where the respondent’s liberty is at stake, the assistance of an
independent expert is essential to a fair trial and impartial
hearing.234
In Ake v. Oklahoma,235 the Supreme Court held a criminal defendant
who raised the insanity defense was entitled to a psychiatric expert to assist
in the preparation and presentation of the case.236 An application of Ake to
the civil commitment context warrants the conclusion that involuntarily
hospitalized individuals who challenge their confinement are also entitled to
this assistance. A court must afford a litigant an “opportunity to participate
meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at stake.”237
This right to meaningful participation applies to civil proceedings that are
“quasi-criminal” in nature.238 While the Supreme Court has never defined
“quasi-criminal,” the state involvement in commitment proceedings and the
constitutionally protected interests, such as liberty, that are at stake in a
commitment proceeding suggest that commitment hearings are “quasicriminal” in nature.239
233. In re Gannon, 301 A.2d 493, 494 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973).
234. In re Williams, 478 N.E.2d 867, 869 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (quoting GOVERNOR’S
COMM’N FOR REVISION OF THE MENTAL HEALTH CODE OF ILL., REPORT 60 (1976)) (citation
omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Curnette, 871 A.2d 839, 843 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (holding
an indigent individual facing civil commitment is entitled to expert assistance in a sexually violent
predator civil commitment proceeding).
235. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
236. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
237. Id. at 76.
238. Id.
239. See Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1981) (holding a paternity suit was quasicriminal because state involvement “undeniably pervaded” the proceeding); In re Ruffalo, 390
U.S. 544, 551 (1968) (determining disbarment proceedings, which require due process protection,
“are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature”). Civil commitment proceedings are far
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However, the concept of meaningful participation is only a starting
point when determining whether due process requires the provision of
expert assistance. Rather, in determining whether due process requires the
provision of expert assistance, a court must examine the private interest
affected by the action of the state, the governmental interest affected if a
court provides the procedural right in question, the probable value of the
safeguard sought, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the appropriate interest if the safeguard is not provided.240
As noted, civil commitment “produces a massive curtailment of
liberty;”241 an “almost uniquely compelling” interest,242 which the Supreme
Court has characterized as a fundamental right.243 While the Supreme
Court has held the Due Process Clause requires the provision of an expert
psychiatrist to an indigent criminal defendant who places his sanity in issue,
the civil committee possesses a far more significant liberty interest than
does the criminal defendant. The criminal defendant who successfully utilizes expert assistance to win a verdict of not guilty or not responsible by
reason of insanity will nevertheless suffer a deprivation of liberty in a psychiatric hospital instead of prison.244 On the other hand, a civil committee
who prevails at his commitment hearing obtains outright release. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has concluded liberty differs qualitatively from other
constitutionally protected interests, requiring greater procedural protections
than other constitutional interests.245 An involuntarily hospitalized patient
also suffers the stigma of the court system labeling him or her as mentally
ill and dangerous, which “can have a very significant impact” on the committee.246 Finally, involuntary hospitalization can subject the civil committee to liability for care and treatment charges.247
more quasi-criminal than these proceedings because the state will invoke its police or parens
patriae powers to confine those deemed to pose a threat to society or themselves. Developments
in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1222 (1972).
240. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.
241. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980) (quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504,
509 (1972)).
242. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.
243. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992).
244. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(2) (McKinney 1996); Jones v. United States,
463 U.S. 354, 364 (1983).
245. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981) (holding the right
to counsel presumptively attaches only when an indigent litigant could face a loss of physical
liberty).
246. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979).
247. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 43.01 (McKinney 1989) (authorizing the New
York State Office of Mental Health to assess care and treatment charges); Rodriguez v. City of
N.Y., 861 F. Supp. 1173, 1188-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 72 F.3d 1051 (2d Cir.
1995); Chill v. Miss. Hosp. Reimbursement Comm’n, 429 So.2d 574, 580-81 (Miss. 1983);
Musselman v. Dept’ of Soc. & Health Servs., 134 P.3d 248, 251 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
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The government interest in not providing expert assistance is ambiguous at best. This is particularly true because of the different governmental
entities whose interests are implicated by the appointment of a psychiatric
expert. One can assume payment for a psychiatric expert comes from the
budget of a state’s office of court administration. While this governmental
agency has a financial interest in not spending money for experts, this
interest is “not substantial.”248 On the other hand, the provision of expert
assistance furthers the interests of the state agency that operates a state’s
psychiatric hospitals and the municipalities that operate psychiatric wards
or entire facilities. Because the provision of psychiatric assistance enhances
the accuracy of civil commitment proceedings,249 psychiatric assistance
furthers the governmental interest “in confining its costly mental health
facilities to cases of genuine need”250 and achieving just and accurate
adjudications within the judicial process.251
The appointment of a psychiatric expert is of great value to a civil
committee; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty without the expert
is significant. What the Supreme Court described in Ake in the context of a
mentally ill defendant asserting the insanity defense applies with equal, if
not greater, force in the civil commitment context: “[P]sychiatrists gather
facts, through professional examination, interviews, and elsewhere, that
they will share with the judge or jury; they analyze the information gathered
and from it draw plausible conclusions.”252 Similarly, the Supreme Court
held for the putative insanity acquittee, expert testimony was a necessity,
and the defendant may be at an unfair advantage “if he is unable because of
poverty to parry by his own witnesses the thrusts of those against him.”253
It is inconceivable that a different conclusion can be reached for a person
civilly committed. First, while doctors invariably testify that a patient is
dangerous, the lack of accuracy in dangerousness assessments warrants the

248. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 79 (1985); see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,
533 (2004) (“[O]rdinary considerations of cost and convenience alone cannot justify a State’s
failure to provide individuals with a meaningful right of access to the courts.”); Little v. Streater,
452 U.S. 1, 16 (1981) (noting a state’s monetary interest in not providing blood grouping “is
hardly significant” compared to the interests of both the individual participants and the state in
obtaining an accurate determination).
249. See infra notes 256-58 and accompanying text.
250. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 585, 604-05 (1979). To illustrate, one study in New York
found more accurate psychiatric assessments can result in diverting to patients living in the community approximately $40,000 per patient wrongfully determined to require inpatient hospitalization. Alan Lipton & Franklin Simon, Psychiatric Diagnosis in a State Hospital: Manhattan
State Revisited, 36 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 368, 372 (1985).
251. See Medine, supra note 232, at 329.
252. Ake, 470 U.S. at 80.
253. Id. at 82 n.8 (internal quotations omitted).
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need for a second opinion.254 If judges carefully scrutinized expert testimony, the absence of a court-appointed expert might not create a particularly significant risk of erroneous deprivations of liberty. However, it is
clear judges do not carefully scrutinize psychiatric testimony.255
It is fair to ask, if psychiatrists frequently lack accuracy in their assessments of danger, why a court-appointed expert could reach a more accurate
assessment about a person’s dangerousness than a psychiatrist who testifies
on behalf of the committing hospital. First, the doctor-patient relationship
does not exist between the court-appointed expert and the civil committee;
this relationship may result in an assessment of danger as a function of a
desire to treat.256 More significantly, even if the conclusions of the courtappointed expert are no more inherently accurate than the hospital physician, when two doctors reach the same conclusion about an individual’s
dangerousness, then one can feel more confident in the assessment of the
hospital physician than if no other doctor reached the same conclusion. If
the court-appointed expert reaches a different conclusion about a committee’s dangerousness than the hospital physician, the differing opinions will
force a judge to scrutinize the opinions of both experts to determine which
opinion should carry more weight.
Finally, the need to combat potentially biased testimony is another
consideration when assessing whether the Constitution requires the provision of expert assistance.257 Indeed, perhaps more than any other witness in
any other litigation, the psychiatrist has the ability to color testimony to
reach the conclusion he or she wishes—that the patient is dangerous. A lay
witness must testify to observations. Experts must support testimony
through detailed methodology and, in the field of science, empirical support. However, because of both the lack of empirical data related to short254. See supra notes 44-56 and accompanying text; see also Ake, 470 U.S. at 81 (noting
psychiatrists frequently disagree on an individual’s dangerousness); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 429 (1979) (discussing the “[l]ack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis”);
Lipton & Simon, supra note 250, at 370 (stating hospital psychiatrists at one state hospital
incorrectly diagnosed seventy-three out of eighty-nine patients as schizophrenic, a diagnosis that
may carry an incorrect prognosis for long-term hospitalization).
255. See supra notes 134-46 and accompanying text; see also MELTON ET AL., supra note
19, at 350 (suggesting the use of a second physician in court may reduce the probability of an
erroneous commitment as a result of uncritical acceptance of a lone doctor’s testimony); Morris et
al., supra note 77, at 200 (discussing a study finding judges agreed with clinicians’ assessments of
danger in 327 out of 328 cases).
256. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text. Admittedly, the patient’s treating doctor
may not testify in court. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text. However, in these
situations, the court-appointed expert may not face the same institutional loyalties or pressures
that might compromise an assessment of danger, such as testifying against the clinical positions
taken by a colleague.
257. See Little v. Streater, 452 U.S 1, 14 (1981) (recognizing the utility of expert testimony
in combating the strong self-interest of litigants that could color testimony in paternity litigation).
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term risk, particularly whether a patient can meet his basic needs, and the
258
vague and value-laden nature of the dangerousness standard, when psychiatrists wish to reach a conclusion a person is dangerous, there is little to
deter the expert from reaching this conclusion.
An application of the Ake standard should have resulted in any court
looking at this issue and concluding the Due Process Clause requires the
provision of expert assistance to a civil committee.259 The one federal court
that addressed this issue ruled otherwise. In Goetz v. Crosson, the court
held due process requires the appointment of a psychiatric expert to assist a
civil committee only in those specific instances when a committee’s attorney can detail reasons why an expert is needed to educate him or her in
particular aspects of a case.260 The court further held due process requires
the appointment of an “independent” psychiatrist, an expert who will serve
the court and be available to testify for either side in the commitment hearing, when the committee is indigent and the trier of fact determines he or
she cannot accurately assess whether a patient meets the civil commitment
criteria in the absence of an expert to provide information to the court.261
The court first noted the results of a civil commitment hearing impact
more than a committee’s interest in liberty, stigma, and paying for
hospitalization; a civil committee possesses an interest in receiving treat262
The committee also has an interest in
ment for one’s mental illness.
avoiding situations that both place the committee at risk of harm or subject
the committee to incarceration or acts of reprisal by third-parties.263 The
court also intimated the provision of expert assistance will result in some
264
mentally ill individuals not receiving treatment. The court concluded the
provision of experts will result in fewer commitments, though a decrease in
commitments differs from an increase in erroneous adjudications, and the
court-appointed expert will not always be correct when testifying for the
patient.265
The court further differentiated civil commitment proceedings from a
criminal trial, concluding that in the commitment setting, the interests of the
parties are not entirely adverse, which lessens the imperative that court258. See supra notes 54, 206 and accompanying text.
259. One could view the right to expert assistance as part of the right to effective assistance
of counsel that necessarily includes the right to reasonably necessary ancillary services. See Waltz
v. Zumwalt, 213 Cal. Rptr. 529, 531 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
260. Goetz v. Crosson (Goetz I), 967 F.2d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1992).
261. Id. at 36.
262. Id. at 33.
263. Id. at 33.
264. Id. at 34.
265. Id.
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appointed experts arrive at the most accurate assessment possible.266
Moreover, the court-appointed neutral expert fulfills the most important
function of the Ake-type expert—providing testimony favorable to the
committee if the doctor’s conclusions warrant this testimony.267 Finally,
the court expressed confidence that lawyers for civil committees could develop a sufficient level of expertise in the field of psychiatry to render
unnecessary the services of an expert to assist in the preparation and
presentation of the committee’s case.268
The rationale adopted by the Second Circuit to avoid applying Ake in a
straightforward manner cannot withstand scrutiny. Without citing any authority, the court assumed state court judges lack the ability to parse conflicting psychiatric testimony. While ample literature exists detailing what
some—including this author—believe constitutes poor performance by
many state court judges who conduct civil commitment hearings,269 one
would expect the addition of contrasting expert testimony would facilitate a
discontinuation of the abdication of the decision-making function by the
courts, if for no other reason than a court must determine which expert provided more persuasive testimony. As the Second Circuit itself recognized,
the underlying premise of the adversary system is if counsel for each party
vigorously represents their clients to the best of their ability, this action
should result generally in an accurate resolution of the case.270 The Second
Circuit cited no reason to believe otherwise in the civil commitment
context.
Furthermore, the need for lawyers to develop expertise does not justify
the appointment of an expert for the court in lieu of one for the civil committee.271 If the appointment of an expert to assist the court, as opposed to
266. Id.
267. Id. at 35.
268. Id.
269. See supra notes 138-48 and accompanying text.
270. See Goetz I, 967 F.2d at 34 (noting competing psychiatric testimony enables the factfinder “to make its most accurate determination of the truth on the issue”) (internal quotations
omitted). However, the court concluded because civil commitment proceedings were not completely adversarial in nature, the logic underlying the “battle of the experts” did not hold in the
civil commitment process. Id. This statement is disingenuous. The logic underlying how a battle
of the experts enhances the truth finding process applies regardless of the degree of adversity
between the parties. To what degree a court should attempt to enhance the truth finding process is
another question.
271. It may be that regardless of the development of expertise, counsel cannot provide the
same level of cross-examination as he or she would with the assistance of an expert. See John
West, Note, Expert Services and the Indigent Criminal Defendant: The Constitutional Mandate of
Ake v. Oklahoma, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1326, 1353-54 (1986). As one authority has asserted, in
order for attorneys to provide effective cross-examination, they must develop expertise through,
inter alia, consultation with their own experts. Id. at 1355 (citing 2 F. LANE, GOLDSTEIN TRIAL
TECHNIQUE § 14.23 (3d ed. 1985)). Even if the Due Process Clause does not require an optimal
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the civil committee, furthered any significant governmental interest, then
advantages resulting from the appointment of an expert to assist the
committee might not be warranted. However, the interest in saving money,
which is the only legitimate government interest implicated by the appointment of an expert, is essentially the same regardless of what type of expert a
court appoints.272
Finally, the Second Circuit’s willingness to treat commitment proceedings as less than fully adversarial is also questionable. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied in substantial part on the recognition that “[i]t
cannot be said . . . that it is much better for a mentally ill person to ‘go free’
than for a mentally normal person to be committed.”273 However, this
consideration is pertinent when determining the proper burden of proof in a
commitment hearing because the burden of proof serves, inter alia, to
allocate the risk of error in any judicial proceeding.274 It has no relevance
when examining the constitutional status of a procedural protection aimed
at enhancing the accuracy of the judicial determination at issue. Regardless
of how the risk of error should be allocated, “an erroneous confinement
should be avoided in the first instance.”275
It is not entirely clear why the Second Circuit believed a hospital’s
desire to provide treatment justified a less than completely adversarial trial
process. Did the court believe even if commitment proceedings resulted in
the confinement of mentally ill individuals who were erroneously deemed
dangerous, the treatment provided to the individuals rendered wrongful
hospitalization more tolerable than a wrongful conviction? The premise
assumes all individuals subject to the civil commitment process suffer from
mental illness and will benefit from treatment; a premise that is certainly
questionable.276 Accordingly, any decision to justify reduced procedural
level of cross-examination, the relative equality of access to assistance at the trial level between a
committing hospital and a patient should constitute a factor in the overall due process analysis,
particularly when little countervailing interests exist in providing a neutral expert as opposed to a
witness for the civil committee.
272. The role of a consultant expert would require approximately the same amount of time as
would the role of an independent expert. The time spent examining the civil committee, reviewing records, and perhaps talking to others is the same in both roles. The amount of travel time and
appearance time is approximately the same. The only difference consists of the ability of an independent expert to leave the courthouse following his testimony while a consultant expert would
remain to assist throughout the entire hearing. Admittedly, the role of a consultant would require
the expert to engage in case discussion and preparation with the civil committee’s attorney. However, this constitutes a small percentage of the time spent by the expert. Hence, any difference in
the cost of a consultant expert as compared to the cost of an independent expert is de minimus.
273. Goetz I, 967 F.2d at 35 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979)).
274. Addington, 441 U.S. at 423.
275. Id. at 428.
276. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 351 (suggesting the stigma and institutional
dependency resulting from hospitalization may outweigh the benefits of treatment).
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safeguards because the government acts in the best interest of the committee must be “candidly appraised” and is particularly troubling in “light of
the wide divergence of medical opinion regarding the diagnosis of and
proper therapy for mental abnormalities.”277
Because of the often questionable consequences of institutional treatment, it is reasonable to conclude a wrongful involuntary hospitalization
will be, at times, more pernicious than a wrongful conviction. This is so for
no other reason than psychiatric hospitals subject civil committees to “intrusive inquiries into . . . [their] . . . innermost thoughts”278 through the use of
mind-altering medication that produces many debilitating side effects.279
Finally, by limiting the provision of an expert to serve the court to only
those cases in which the court deems the appointment necessary for a
reliable assessment of the committee, the Second Circuit placed the committees in a particularly tenuous position. Primarily because judges overvalue psychiatric testimony,280 which also necessarily means courts undervalue lay evidence, civil committees may require expert testimony just to
explain why a reliable assessment of his psychiatric condition requires
independent expert testimony. The plaintiffs in Goetz raised a second issue
of importance in developing a mechanism to provide expert testimony to
assist individuals in the commitment process: the permissible period of
delay resulting from the appointment of an expert. The Goetz plaintiffs
litigated this issue following the remand of the case by the Second Circuit,
as the appointment of the court expert resulted in delays of four to six
weeks.281 A review of pertinent law demonstrates that a failure to provide a
timely commitment hearing when a court appoints an expert violates the
Constitution.282

277. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 586-87 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
278. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 324 (1993).
279. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 293 n.1 (1982).
280. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
281. Goetz v. Crosson (Goetz II), 41 F.3d 800, 803 (2d Cir. 1994).
282. It is difficult to set forth a bright-line rule regarding the point at which a delay will violate due process because courts are reluctant to measure due process requirements in a fixed term
of days. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 975 (2d Cir. 1983). However, due process
is “flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands[.]” Id.
(internal quotations omitted). Thus, due process requires courts to take steps to develop a list of
experts—similar to a list of lawyers—who are available for appointment to satisfy the constraints
of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). In so doing, due process requires courts to spend
enough money to induce experts to serve on the panel and remain available to promptly examine
patients and testify. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2002);
N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n v. State, 196 Misc.2d 761, 790 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003) (holding the
judicial system violates due process when it fails to effectively provide constitutionally required
procedural protections because of the amount of money it pays professionals to provide services).
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The government may not condition the exercise of a right or privilege
upon the forfeiture of another right or privilege.283 State law conferred
upon the plaintiff class in Goetz a right to a hearing within five days.284
Furthermore, many courts have recognized the Constitution requires the
right to a hearing within a period shorter than six weeks.285 Hence, requireing civil committees to wait up to six weeks for a hearing with the opportunity to present favorable expert testimony can be construed as conditioning
the exercise of the right to expert assistance upon the forfeiture of the right
to a prompt hearing and/or a violation of basic due process tenets that
require a prompt hearing in order to challenge one’s hospitalization.286
Significant delays that result from the appointment of an expert violate
another constitutional doctrine: the government may not institute a practice
that chills the assertion of a constitutional right.287 An impermissible chill
exists when requiring patients to choose between a hearing within five days
and requesting the appointment of an independent psychiatrist “impairs to
an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved.”288
283. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); see also Thomas v. Review Bd. of
Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716-17 (1981).
284. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.31 (McKinney 2006).
285. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1091-92 (D. Wis. 1972), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), reinstated, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (D. Wis. 1974),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (D.
Wis. 1976) (requiring a judicial hearing within fourteen days); Kendall v. True, 391 F. Supp. 413,
419 (D. Ky. 1975) (requiring a court hearing within twenty-one days of confinement; requiring a
probable cause hearing initially); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 388 (D. Ala. 1974)
(requiring a full judicial hearing within thirty days, but a probable cause hearing within seven
days).
286. As two officials of the National Center for State Courts recognized, a litigant whose
liberty is at stake should not forfeit statutory or constitutionally imposed standards governing
speedy trial provisions simply because the litigant requires the use of a psychiatric expert. See
Pamela Casey & Ingo Keilitz, An Examination of Mental Health Expert Assistance Provided to
Indigent Criminal Defendants: Organization, Administration and Fiscal Management, 34 N.Y. L.
SCH. L. REV. 19, 106-07 (1989).
287. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581-82 (1968); United States v.
Glover, 588 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1978) (examining whether a statute that permits a court to
impose the costs of prosecution chills a defendants’ assertion of the right to stand trial). Although
the impermissible chill argument is similar to the argument that the excessive delays resulting from the
appointment of an expert impermissibly conditions the right to expert testimony on the waiver of the
right to a prompt hearing, these arguments are distinct. The latter argument is based upon a line of
cases that prohibit the state from requiring an individual to choose between one of two rights or
privileges, both of which an individual is entitled to exercise. The “chill” argument is based upon a
line of cases that hold the government may not unduly discourage the exercise of one’s constitutional
right by imposing an unwarranted penalty that significantly deters an individual from exercising such
right. See, e.g., Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581-82; Glover, 588 F.2d at 878.
288. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32 (1973). The right to a prompt hearing furthers
the individual interest in avoiding unnecessary confinement and the possible liability for hospital
charges. See supra notes 241, 247 and accompanying text. It also furthers the governmental
interest in limiting inpatient mental health services to cases of genuine need. See supra note 250
and accompanying text.
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However, in Goetz v. Crosson (Goetz II),289 the Second Circuit failed to
290
address these issues. Rather, the court concluded because of the lack of
available experts, and the failure of the plaintiffs to provide a meaningful
remedy to correct the problem, the district court did not err in finding four
to six week delays did not violate the rights of civil committees.291
However, in so ruling, the court ignored the firmly established distinction
between a constitutional violation and the remedy needed to correct it.292
Until state courts implement a plan that guarantees civil committees
with such assistance, the committees will remain severely disadvantaged
when they challenge initial dangerousness determinations by psychiatrists.
Any such plan must require psychiatrists to commit to examine patients and
appear on the first scheduled date of the proceeding, while understanding
the appointment requires them to assist the civil committee and his counsel.
If and/or when civil committees in other jurisdictions raise challenges
similar to those in Goetz I and Goetz II, the courts should reject those cases
as persuasive authority.
C. PROHIBIT EXPERTS FROM RENDERING OPINIONS ABOUT AN
INDIVIDUAL’S DANGEROUSNESS BASED ON UNSTRUCTURED
CLINICAL JUDGMENT
Whether a psychiatrist, in testifying, “predicts” that a civil committee
will likely cause harm or “assesses” the level of risk posed by the committee as sufficiently great to render him or her dangerous, the expert renders
expert testimony on the ultimate issue of danger. Numerous authorities
have asserted psychiatrists should not render opinion testimony about an
individual’s dangerousness.293 More significantly, there exists support in
Delaying the commitment hearing many weeks clearly lessens the remedial impact of a hearing that should correct errors in the initial decision by one or more physicians to confine an
individual. If requiring indigent defendants to reimburse the government for the cost of courtappointed counsel impermissibly chills the right to court-appointed counsel, see Olson v. James,
603 F.2d 150, 155 (10th Cir. 1979); Fitch v. Belshaw, 581 F. Supp. 273, 276 (D. Or. 1984), any
plan that significantly penalizes a mentally ill individual for seeking favorable expert testimony
poses significant concerns. Likewise, if undue delays in the appellate criminal process violate due
process, see Cody v. Henderson, 936 F.2d 715, 719 (2d Cir. 1991), or other proceedings in which
a constitutional interest is at stake, see Kraebel v. Dep’t of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 959 F.2d 395, 405
(2d Cir. 1992), the same result should apply when one must wait an excessive amount of time in a
psychiatric hospital before challenging one’s confinement.
289. 41 F.3d 800 (2d Cir. 1994).
290. Goetz II, 41 F.3d at 803-05.
291. Id. at 804-05.
292. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1971).
293. See, e.g., MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 350; Robert Schopp et al., Expert Testimony
and Sexual Predator Statutes After Hendricks, 6 EXPERT EVIDENCE 1, 15 (1998); Robert Schopp
& Michael Quattrocchi, Predicting The Present: Expert Testimony and Civil Commitment, 13
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 159, 160 (1993).
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the law for prohibiting experts from rendering opinions about an individual’s dangerousness.
The Supreme Court’s opinions in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals294 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael295 established the
standards governing expert testimony in federal court.296 Numerous states
have adopted the Daubert criteria.297 The standard adopted in Frye v.
United States298 continues to serve as the law governing expert testimony in
other jurisdictions.299 An application of either standard requires courts to
rule psychiatrists should not testify a patient is or is not “dangerous” when
these clinicians base their opinion on clinical judgment alone. This is the
case whether the expert seeks to testify the patient poses a danger to others,
poses a danger to self because of an inability to meet his or her basic needs,
or is dangerous because of a threat of suicide.
Daubert requires a trial judge to consider the following criteria to
determine the admissibility of expert opinions: whether the scientific
theory or technique can be, and has been, tested;300 whether the theory or
technique has been subject to peer review and publication; the known rate
of error for any particular technique; and the general rate of acceptance
within the relevant scientific community.301 A court can also consider
whether existing standards control the technique’s operation.302 As for
assessments of danger based on a determination that a patient lacks the
ability to meet his or her needs, there has been no testing whatsoever to
determine what factors correlate to a heightened risk of self-harm.303
294. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
295. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
296. Daubert addressed the issue of the admissibility of scientific testimony. See Daubert,
509 U.S. at 593. Kumho Tire applied Daubert to all expert testimony. See Kumho Tire, 526 U.S.
at 147-48. Hence, Kumho Tire eliminates the need to address the rather thorny question of
whether psychiatry is a science, although one court has characterized it as an art rather than a
science. See People v. Stoll, 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
297. Post Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in
State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453 §§ 12-13 (2001) [hereinafter Post Daubert Standards].
298. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
299. Post Daubert Standards, supra note 297, §§ 12-13.
300. Kumho Tire makes clear that a trial judge can also consider whether any theory or
technique underlying specialized, but non-scientific, knowledge can be, and has been, tested. See
Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149.
301. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
302. Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 149.
303. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. A risk factor is a variable that correlates
with a projected outcome and the variable precedes the outcome, although a causal relationship
does not necessarily exist between the variable and the outcome. See Monahan, supra note 46, at
905-06 n.27. Viewed another way, “[a] correlation is the statistical degree of relationship between
two variables.” Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Danger at the Edge of Chaos:
Predicting Violent Behavior in a Post-Daubert World, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1845, 1860-61 n.91
(2003).
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Although not applying Daubert, one court concluded expert testimony
lacked competence when the expert relied on risk factors derived from
clinical judgment not based on any scientific research or principles accepted
in the psychological community.304
Likewise, there have been virtually no publications relating to the
assessment process pertaining to one’s inability to meet one’s needs.305
Moreover, while there is no known rate of error, literature suggests psychiatrists lack the ability to determine who can manage in the community in the
absence of inpatient treatment.306 Furthermore, empirical data relating to
the assessment of violence risk establishes clinical evaluations alone are far
less accurate than both actuarial assessments and assessments where an
actuarial assessment guides the clinical process.307 There is general acceptance of clinical assessments in the sense that the psychiatric profession
continues to engage in them, notwithstanding the general criticism of the
process. Finally, no standards exist to control the manner in which psychiatrists assess one’s ability to meet one’s needs.
Empirical literature detailing risk factors for suicide exists.308 To the
extent literature has assessed the accuracy of clinical assessments of danger,
the low base rate of suicide behavior results in inaccurate assessments of
danger.309 As in the case of assessing one’s ability to meet needs, the psychiatric profession engages in the practice, but the profession has imposed
no controls over the manner in which psychiatrists conduct the assessments.
The application of the Daubert criteria to assessments of the risk of
harm to others does not warrant a different result in connection with an
unstructured assessment of danger. First, a slightly better-than-chance level
of success310 should not satisfy the requirement of evidentiary reliability as
to warrant admissibility. When one compares the slightly better-thanchance success rate with the significant concordance rate between opinion
304. See In re Coffel, 117 S.W.3d 116, 129 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
305. One set of authorities has detailed a number of considerations for clinicians to examine
when assessing one’s ability to meet his needs. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 358. These
criteria appear to consist of practical, common sense factors that enable clinicians to draw logical
inferences about a person’s ability to meet his or her needs. However, they were not based on
empirical studies. Two authorities contend testifying clinicians should limit any assertion that a
civil committee is dangerous to those situations where the civil committee presents similar characteristics to subjects in studies that serve as the predictive model for the testifying expert. See
Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, Is it Unethical to Offer Predictions of Future Violence, 16
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 621, 624 n.4 (1992). As noted, no such models exist today.
306. See Morse, supra note 76, at 596. Although Professor Morse detailed this lack of skill
over thirty years ago, the author is not aware of any more recent research to the contrary.
307. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
308. See, e.g., MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 355-57.
309. See, e.g., id. at 357.
310. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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testimony and judicial dispositions,311 the prejudicial effect of the expert
testimony outweighs its probative value.312 Accordingly, while the two
generations of this type of empirical research have been subject to publication and peer review, the general unreliability of unstructured clinical
assessments and the absence of any limitations on clinical judgment should
render these opinions inadmissible.313
Finally, the amorphous meaning of danger means any assessment of
danger results in an expert incorporating his or her own values about
liberty, a factor that has no relation to any professional expertise.314 Until
empirically-generated data enables clinicians to offer specific opinions
about the level of risk posed in terms of particular numerical probabilities
that are based on a reasonable degree of professional certainty, any assessment of risk contains a value judgment that warrants a finding of inadmissibility.315 Nor should courts that apply the Frye standard admit into
evidence opinions about a civil committee’s dangerousness. Frye authorizes admission when the principle or procedure in question has gained

311. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
312. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993). To illustrate, there has
been only one study over the last twenty years that examined the accuracy of violence assessments
made in psychiatric emergency rooms. Monahan, supra note 47, at 407. This study contained a
false positive rate of almost forty-seven percent. See Lidz et al., supra note 41, at 1010. If one
assumes a ninety percent concordance rate between judicial dispositions and expert conclusions,
see supra note 139 and accompanying text, this means a court will erroneously confine approximately four out of every ten patients assessed. This turns on its head the contention by Judge
Newman of the Second Circuit that the ratio of erroneous releases to erroneous confinements
should be approximately three or five to one. See Goetz v. Crosson, 967 F.2d 29, 39 (2d Cir.
1992) (Newman, J., concurring).
313. See Harris & Rice, supra note 59, at 1169 (stating no evidence exists that clinicians’
unaided assessments of violence risk are better than those of laypersons). One authority has
concluded from the time of the initial studies detailing an inability of clinicians to assess violence
risk, “[l]ittle has transpired . . . to increase confidence in the ability of psychologists or psychiatrists, using their unstructured clinical judgment, to accurately assess violence risk.” Monahan,
supra note 47, at 406-07; Simon, supra note 200, at 642 (noting an assessment of imminent harm
is unlikely to satisfy the Daubert requirements). But see Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 562
(Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (holding expert testimony about a defendant’s dangerousness admissible
notwithstanding the absence of any particular methodology that one could subject to scrutiny
because of empirical research relating to sexual offenders).
314. See Binder & McNeil, supra note 115, at 1192; Schopp & Quattrocchi, supra note 293,
at 166. Perhaps one day appellate decisions will generate enough specificity as to what constitutes
dangerousness to eliminate the potential for an expert’s intrinsic values about liberty impacting
any assessment about an individual’s dangerousness. This might well require case law clarifying:
(1) the likelihood of harm required in terms of a particular percentage; (2) how, if in any way, the
potential magnitude impacts any assessment of danger; and (3) the impact of considerations of the
imminence of any potential harm.
315. Cf. Paul Slovic et al., Violence Risk Assessment and Risk Communication: The Effects
of Using Actual Cases Providing Instruction, and Employing Probability Versus Frequency
Formats, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 271, 272 (2000).
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general acceptance in its specified field.316 However, when one evaluates
the general acceptance of psychiatric assessments of danger, a little perspective is in order. Prior to O’Connor v. Donaldson and its progeny, both
the law and clinical practice required psychiatrists to assess only mental
illness and a need for treatment. This required only an assessment of
symptoms and behaviors, a practice for which members of the psychiatric
profession were trained. When the law required a completely different
determination of dangerousness, psychiatrists continued to make the
required assessments without regard to their ability to do so. While a few
authorities have questioned the appropriateness of a dangerousness standard,317 the psychiatric profession as a whole has continued to make these
assessments willingly, if for no other reason than it has helped perpetuate its
control over the civil commitment process.318
Hence, assessments of danger differ from all other novel scientific
evidence that Frye governs. When examining the admissibility of a particular scientific technique, the scientific community of which the testifying
expert is part has little interest in the particular judicial proceeding at hand,
or judicial proceedings in general that the question requiring expert analysis
has been raised. The profession’s only interest is its professional integrity.
However, the psychiatric profession possesses an institutional interest in:
(1) accepting its clinical assessment as reliable; and (2) having assessments
of danger gain general acceptance in the community to further the professional prerogative of facilitating the commitments of individuals doctors
want to treat. Accordingly, an assumption exists that when novel scientific
evidence gains acceptance in the relevant scientific community, sufficient
evidentiary reliability exists to warrant admissibility. This is not the case
with assessments of danger.
As a general rule, opinion testimony is admissible when an expert
possesses sufficient skill, knowledge, or experience so the opinion will aid
the trier of fact.319 It is clear as to the issues of the risk posed by one’s
inability to meet one’s needs and one’s suicidality, no particular expertise
exists. While empirical research provides a font of knowledge for
psychiatrists to apply on the issue of violence, the unchecked use of clinical
316. See, e.g., People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 454 (N.Y. 1994); In re Detention of
Strauss, 20 P.3d 1022, 1025 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
317. See, e.g., Norko, supra note 46, at 282.
318. This can be evidenced in no small part by the brief of the APA before the Supreme
Court where the APA argued psychiatrists lacked the ability to assess long-term danger, but
emphasized the existence of the professional prerogative to assess short-term danger in the civil
commitment process. Brief of Amicus Curiae for the American Psychiatric Association at 10 n.7,
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080).
319. 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 137, at 69-70.
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discretion renders too many assessments of risk unreliable. When an expert
relies on clinical judgment alone, no mechanism exists to determine
whether the expert has applied the empirical data in a valid way to warrant
the conclusion the testimony will aid the trier of fact.320 That the question
of an individual’s dangerousness is an ultimate issue in a commitment hearing further militates toward a determination that opinions of dangerousness
are inadmissible.321 Opinion testimony on an ultimate issue is admissible
only when it addresses subject matter beyond the realm of the factfinder,
the facts cannot be described to the factfinder in a way that will enable him
or her to form an accurate judgment, and no better evidence than opinion
testimony is available.322
Better evidence is available and it enables clinicians to provide appropriate testimony in civil commitment proceedings. Clinicians can testify
about what factors relate to any heightened risk of harm and how the symptoms of mental illness and the civil committee’s behavior relate to known
risk factors for harm.323 Such a rule strikes a proper balance between the
court’s interests in obtaining information from experts who can educate the
court while eliminating highly prejudicial testimony that is both value-laden
and evidentiarily unreliable.324
Approximately thirty years ago, one critic equated psychiatrists who
render testimony with used car salesman and carnival barkers—individuals
320. See Monahan, supra note 63, at 513 (discussing the longstanding recognition that
assessments produced by clinical judgment alone lack reliability and validity).
321. The ultimate issue is a question that must be answered to resolve a proceeding. See
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 908 (9th ed. 2009).
322. People v. Keindl, 502 N.E.2d 577, 582-83 (N.Y. 1986); People v. Cronin, 458 N.E.2d
351, 352 (N.Y. 1983).
323. See MELTON ET AL., supra note 19, at 350; Schopp et al., supra note 293, at 15. Use of
expert testimony in this manner answers the court in People v. Ward, where the court admitted
expert testimony about an individual’s dangerousness on the ground, inter alia, that in civil
commitment cases, an expert’s prediction about danger may be the only evidence available.
People v. Ward, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 828, 832 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). In addition to excluding
testimony about subject matter that far exceeds any clinician’s expertise, prohibiting experts from
rendering opinions about a subject’s dangerousness helps to eliminate the problem of judges
relying on expert testimony without any scrutiny. See Paul Appelbaum et al., Expert Approaches
to Communicating Violence Risk, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 137, 145 (2000).
324. Two courts, relying on Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), have authorized the use
of clinical assessment of an individual’s dangerousness. See In re Commitment of R.S., 773 A.2d
72, 90 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Lyle G. v. Harlem Valley Psychiatric Ctr., 521 N.Y.S.2d
94, 95 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987). Reliance on Barefoot to exclude testimony under state evidentiary
principles was wrong because the court in Barefoot held only that the Constitution did not prohibit
expert testimony about danger. See Barefoot, 483 U.S. at 896, 905 n.9. Ironically, the Court in
Barefoot distinguished People v. Murtishaw, 631 P.2d 446 (Cal. 1981), where the California
Supreme Court held the trial court committed error in admitting a testimony concerning
dangerousness. The Court in Barefoot distinguished Murtishaw on the ground, inter alia, that the
California Supreme Court did not base its decision on constitutional grounds. See Barefoot, 463
U.S. at 901-02 n.8.
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who engage in polished double talk to hide a lack of competence about
which they speak.325 While such criticism no longer applies to clinicians
who assess risk based upon empirically grounded criteria, it holds true
today with those psychiatrists who assert patients cannot meet their needs
when no empirical research exists to support such testimony. Prohibiting
psychiatrists from rendering expert opinions sends a message: if you
believe someone poses enough of a risk to warrant commitment, first back
up your conclusions with empirical data, and then show the court your
assessment has eliminated any value judgments inherent in any assessment
of danger.
D. ATTORNEYS FOR PATIENTS MUST SYSTEMATICALLY APPEAL
ADVERSE COMMITMENT DECISIONS AND APPELLATE COURTS
MUST HOLD THESE APPEALS FALL WITHIN A
MOOTNESS EXCEPTION
The amorphous and value laden nature of the concept of dangerousness
means that in the absence of appellate decisions interpreting the concept of
danger, physicians and trial courts will remain relatively free to interpret
danger in any way they choose.326 Only systematic appeals that result in
appellate courts interpreting the dangerousness criteria will eliminate the
problem.
Systematic appellate review enables courts to set forth criteria for
lower courts to apply when assessing whether a patient’s clinical condition
warrants a finding of danger.327 Appellate review further results in clarification as to what conduct and symptoms of mental illness are sufficiently
probative of the level or risk of harm that satisfies the legal criteria of
danger.328
325. See Poythress, supra note 139, at 205-06.
326. See, e.g., Datlof, supra note 202, at 3, 18 (noting the elastic concept of dangerousness
has resulted in courts within the same jurisdiction interpreting the criteria inconsistently).
327. See In re David B., 97 N.Y.2d 267, 277-78 (N.Y. 2002) (suggesting courts consider a
patient’s history of violent relapses when released into the community, history of substance abuse,
the need for medication to control possible violence, and likely noncompliance with prescripttions); In re George L., 85 N.Y.2d 295, 308 (N.Y. 1995); In re Burton, 464 N.E.2d 530, 534 (Ohio
1984) (directing lower courts to examine, inter alia, a patient’s insight into his or her clinical
condition as to warrant compliance with a medication regimen and likelihood of compliance if not
confined).
328. To illustrate, case law out of Oregon limits clinical discretion by making clear that a
direct link must exist between prior actions, symptoms of mental illness, and a sufficiently high
risk of harm as to warrant commitment. See, e.g., State v. M.C., 206 P.3d 1096, 1098 (Or. Ct.
App. 2009) (destroying an identification card in a fit of rage, spending disability income on drugs,
and choosing to live on the streets in the dead of winter does not constitute clear and convincing
evidence the civil committee posed enough risk of harm to self to warrant commitment); State v.
Hambleton, 123 P.3d 370, 375 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (swimming once in forty degree weather did
not render a patient dangerous because there was no showing the patient would again engage in
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Appellate courts can also interpret ambiguous terms inherent in the
concept of danger, which will further lessen the potential for the personal
values of experts to inappropriately influence their testimony.329 Finally,
appellate review can also result in other rules that will lessen the influence
of psychiatric assessments of danger, such as requiring proof of a factual
basis supporting expert opinions.330 However, the short-term nature of civil
commitment orders results in the expiration of an appealed commitment
order prior to the resolution of most appeals. Appellate courts have struggled with the issue of whether the short-term nature of commitment orders
warrants finding an exception to the mootness doctrine to such a degree that
the same court has issued seemingly contradictory rulings.331
If for no other reason, the collateral consequences of a commitment
order warrant the resolution of any appeal rendered moot by the expiration
of the commitment order.332 Moreover, the cyclical nature of mental illness
means it is likely a civil committee will again be subject to another commitment proceeding.333 Because one’s clinical and behavioral history impacts

the conduct or that the patient had or would suffer hypothermia); State v. Hayes, 121 P.3d 17, 21
(Or. Ct. App. 2005) (holding auditory hallucinations that told the civil committee to act out sexual
assault on a puppy was insufficient proof the committee would suffer harm as a result of the
hallucinations); State v. North, 76 P.3d 685, 688-89 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (determining a likely
eviction, a desire not to take medication, and suffering one assault, without more, did not mean the
patient would lack an ability to meet needs in the near future or suffer another assault if not
confined); State v. Nguyen, 43 P.3d 1218, 1220 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) (failure to treat diabetes did
not mean the disease was life-threatening; general mental or physical deterioration did not
necessarily mean the patient was dangerous).
329. See Cooley v. Superior Court, 57 P.3d 654, 670 (Cal. 2002) (defining “likely to
reoffend” as a “serious and well-founded risk” that the committee will commit sexually violent
crimes); In re Commitment of Curiel, 597 N.W.2d 697, 704 (Wis. 1999) (defining “substantially
probable” as much more likely than not).
330. See, e.g., Johnstone v. State, 961 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. App. 1997); In re Cochran, 487
N.E.2d 389, 390-92 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
331. Compare Boggs v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp. Corp., 70 N.Y.2d 972, 974 (1988)
(dismissing appeal as moot), and In re Alfred H.H., 910 N.E.2d 74, 77-85 (Ill. 2009) (holding
none of the exceptions to mootness doctrine warranted a determination of appeal), with George L.,
85 N.Y.2d at 302 n.2 (determining an expiration of a commitment order does not render an appeal
moot because of the impact an appeal would have in the future), and In re Barbara H., 702 N.E.2d
555, 559 (Ill. 1998) (stating the exception to mootness doctrine exists because of the short-term
nature of a commitment order and the reasonable expectation a civil committee would again be
subjected to the same action).
332. See e.g., In re Nancy A., 801 N.E.2d 565, 574-75 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (determining
commitment impacts adversely on the reputation of even someone previously hospitalized
numerous times, thus requiring appellate review); In re Commitment of R.B., 386 A.2d 893, 894
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1978) (noting a lien resulting from imposition of care and treatment charges
warranted deciding the commitment appeal); J.M. v. State, 178 S.W.3d 185, 189 (Tex. Ct. App.
2005) (stating the stigma resulting from hospitalization constitutes a collateral consequence of a
moot commitment order); State v. Condrick, 477 A.2d 632, 633 (Vt. 1984) (holding the
imposition of legal disabilities and the resulting stigma from commitment warranted resolution of
an otherwise moot appeal).
333. See Barbara H., 702 N.E.2d at 559-60.
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any assessment of danger,334 there can be little question any judicial
determination of mental illness and danger creates collateral consequences
for the civil committee by creating a very real risk a history of hospitalization will have an adverse impact on a future assessment of danger. However, more than any collateral consequences resulting from commitment,
appellate courts must recognize only they, through the promulgation of case
law, can provide the necessary guidance as to what constitutes a sufficient
level of risk of harm to warrant commitment. The need to clarify governing
standards relating to the systematic deprivation of liberty of a vulnerable
segment of society satisfies the public interest exception to the mootness
doctrine that warrants resolution of appealed commitment orders that have
expired.335
Furthermore, while a court may initially believe the adoption of the
public interest exception to the mootness doctrine simply to clarify the law
through precedent is unwarranted,336 the need to clarify law that is in disarray warrants invoking the public interest exception.337 A legal standard
that enables those who wish to apply it in a significantly unfettered manner
amounts to law that is in disarray. Attorneys for civil committees should
continue to attempt to clarify the meaning of danger through appeals of
commitment orders until the highest court of their state concludes the need
to clarify what constitutes “dangerousness” does not warrant invoking an
exception to the mootness doctrine. If this were to occur, then it might well
mean the failure of a state’s court system to clarify a constitutional standard
that is inherently ambiguous amounts to a due process violation that
warrants relief in the federal courts.338

334. See, e.g., WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 121, at 28, 38.
335. Numerous jurisdictions have adopted a public interest exception to the mootness
doctrine. See, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding a resolution to an
appeal of a moot commitment order was warranted because a number of people would be
impacted by such an appeal); Campbell v. State, 846 S.W.2d 639, 640 (Ark. 1993) (stating the
court will decide moot cases of great public interest); Hashimi v. Kalil, 446 N.E.2d 1387, 1389
(Mass. 1983) (holding a public interest exception to mootness doctrine was invoked because of the
great public importance in interpreting a commitment statute); In re N.B., 620 P.2d 1228, 1231
(Mont. 1980) (deciding an appeal of an expired commitment order because of broad public
concern in the resolution of the appeal); Proctor v. Butler, 380 A.2d 673, 675 (N.H. 1977)
(invoking a public interest exception to mootness doctrine to decide important questions of law);
In re Brunnell, 668 P.2d 1119, 1121 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983) (deciding a moot commitment appeal
of great public importance).
336. See Alfred H.H., 910 N.E.2d at 81.
337. Id.
338. See supra notes 183-214 and accompanying text.
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VII. CONCLUSION
After the Supreme Court decision in O’Connor v. Donaldson, and
federal district court cases such as Lessard v. Schmidt, imposed substantial
substantive and procedural protections on states’ civil commitment
processes, much promise existed that psychiatrists would be prohibited
from imposing their values as to what is best for someone at the expense of
civil liberties. It did not happen. Like the defeated confederacy after the
Civil War, much of institutional psychiatry made clear its disdain for the
new legal order and challenged those in a position to enforce the newly
established legal norms to force change. With a few exceptions, little has
happened. Again, with exceptions, lawyers for civilly committed patients
have ceded their adversary role and tiptoed gingerly in the courtroom. To a
significant degree, courts have abandoned their role of neutral arbiters. In
addition, the amorphous concept of danger, a constitutional standard that
was supposed to significantly limit commitments, has significantly contributed to psychiatrists continuing to impose their values in an unchecked
manner. It is time for lawyers and courts to step up.
Courts must afford committed patients an opportunity to present
prompt expert testimony and prohibit psychiatrists testifying on behalf of
either party in the commitment process from rendering testimony on the
ultimate issue of danger. Lawyers for patients must vigorously represent
their clients in the commitment process in a way they would want others to
represent their closest family members. This includes systematically appealing adverse commitment decisions in a way that generates case law that
clarifies the meaning of danger as to limit the discretion of psychiatrists in
the future.
Finally, psychiatrists must respect the law and take their obligation to
conduct careful assessments of risk far more seriously than they presently
do. They must recognize regardless of whether they agree with legal standards that limit their clinical discretion, the law has entrusted them to apply
these standards. Psychiatrists can start with recognizing use of clinical
judgment alone is likely to result in too many erroneous assessments of
danger, and structure risk assessments around empirically-based clinical
criteria. When all this occurs, the protections set in place over thirty years
ago will no longer be more apparent than real.

